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My dissertation explores social capital and coordinated investment using experimental methods. 
Chapter 1 is motivated by the observed relationship between trust attitudes and economic growth 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). I hypothesize that trust 
as measured in standard survey questions may be capturing the ability of people to coordinate in 
situations where they both stand to gain if they overcome the risk that the other will not follow 
suit. This result may help explain (by providing a potential mechanism) the relationship between 
these survey measures of trust and macroeconomic performance. Chapter 2 examines the 
importance that expectations of behavior are commonly understood in a coordinated investment 
setting. That is, how does knowing what others think about what I will do affect what I think 
about them, and how should I respond to these second order beliefs? Chapter 3 is a field study in 
collaboration with Professor Randall Walsh. We explore the causal impact of trust on 
investment. We study how quasi-experimental shifts in trust attitudes caused by proximity to 
crime affect survey respondents' trust attitudes and investment behavior in incentivized tasks.  
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1.0  SOCIAL CAPITAL AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN STAG HUNT GAMES 
Surveys of trusting attitudes are found to correlate with growth and development outcomes. The 
question of why trust attitudes correlate with economic growth remains open however. I argue 
that trust surveys capture facets of social capital not previously investigated, namely, 
coordination. Hence a complete investigation of the relationship between trust attitudes in 
growth must encompass their predictive power in a coordination game. This study shows that 
affirmative responses to surveys of trust attitudes correlate with and predict efficiency-
supporting behavior in a Stag Hunt game. 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Going back to at least Smith's Wealth of Nations, economists have studied why some societies 
are more prosperous than others. The “social capital” literature focuses on the role played by 
institutions, norms and beliefs that enable people to participate in mutually beneficial economic 
activities. Social capital can have many dimensions; but trust is thought to be crucial. Putnam 
(1993), contrasts local government effectiveness among the regions of Italy following power 
devolution in the 1970s. He finds that government effectiveness highly correlates with civic 
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engagement
1
 and generalized trust in others. Trust attitudes have standard measurement 
instruments found on surveys such as the General Social Survey and World Values Survey; and 
are found by cross-country studies, seminally Knack and Keefer (1997), to correlate with growth 
and other measures of institutional performance. 
What mechanisms generate these reduced-form correlations? A literature has arisen in 
experimental economics seeking to tie trust attitudes to specific behavioral patterns that are 
candidates for generating macro-level outcomes. One model is the trust game studied by Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). In that game, a sender decides how much money to transfer to a 
receiver. Money sent is multiplied; hence social surplus is maximized by sending the entirety of 
one's endowment. The receiver has the ability, but no obligation, to return some of the resulting 
surplus to the sender. For the sender to trust the receiver will return a monetary transfer is 
efficient, but not part of a Nash equilibrium. Glaeser et al. (2000) however find that survey trust 
questions are not correlated with trusting behavior in the Berg et al. trust game. While 
trustworthy behavior (the receiver returning a sender's transfer) is correlated with survey 
trustworthiness questions, this is not the efficiency-generating action. A follow-on literature to 
Glaeser et al. confirms that behavior in the trust game is not robustly related to survey questions 
on trust. If the type of trust displayed in the trust game stands behind macro-level outcomes, it 
does not appear to be a channel through which trust attitude surveys are correlated with growth. 
                                                 
1
 Putnam measures local government effectiveness as perceived citizen powerlessness, 
corruption, respect for the law and public safety. Putnam’s civic engagement comprises 
referendum turnout, newspaper readership, number of sports and cultural associations in the 
community and the ability of political machines to enforce “preference voting”. 
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We can respond to this finding in a number of ways. One is to focus on what trust game behavior 
is correlated with and build on those results. Another might be to dismiss the correlation between 
trust and prosperity as simply being generated by reverse causation: more prosperous societies 
instill trust in their citizens because people look backwards at a track record of success. Putnam 
himself argues against a causal interpretation of his data, emphasizing “path-dependent social 
equilibria” and saying that “Norms and networks of civic engagement contribute to economic 
prosperity and in turn are reinforced by that prosperity.” Algan and Cahuc (2010) suggest that 
reverse causality is not solely responsible for observed data patterns, however. Their 
identification strategy argues for a causal interpretation of trust attitudes on growth – a result 
which demands further inquiry into the mechanisms generating it. 
I argue that the ability to coordinate on efficient actions when they are risky is a form of 
social capital that can generate growth and prosperity. Social capital could be more than merely a 
question of finding Pareto-superior deviations from equilibrium play, however. Rather a society 
with substantial social capital may be successful in coordinating on Pareto-preferred equilibria. If 
trusting attitudes, revealed through standard survey measures, predict behavior in coordination 
problems this might explain why they are correlated with growth and other measures of 
institutional performance. This study establishes that trust surveys do predict behavior in a 
coordination game.  
1.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The ability to exploit Pareto-improving opportunities in the face of uncertainty has profound 
relevance to economic development and entrepreneurship. Social capital is that which connects, 
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directs, or otherwise enables economic activity. Dasgupta (2008) collects overlapping 
definitions: 
‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’ – Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 
(1993, p. 167); 
‘Social capital refers to connections among individuals -- social networks and the norms 
of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.’ – Putnam (2000, p. 19); and 
‘Social capital generally refers to trust, concern for one's associates, a willingness to live 
by the norms of one's community and to punish those who do not.’ – Bowles and Gintis 
(2002, p. F419). 
Social capital is most commonly measured with survey instruments on the General Social 
Survey or World Values survey. The standard `trust question', found on both, is 
‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be 
too careful in dealing with people?’ 
and will henceforth be referred to as GSS_trust. Accompanying the standard trust question is a 
variant, also on both the GSS and WVS, the standard ‘fair question’ 
‘Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, 
or would they try to be fair?’ 
Trust attitudes are oft-used regressors in development and growth studies. Knack and 
Keefer (1997) correlate trust and civic norms as measured on the World Values Survey with 
measures of economic performance in a cross-section of 29 countries. These most prominently 
include growth, but also investment share of GDP, labor force growth, openness to trade, black 
market penetration, strength of property rights, currency depreciation, creditworthiness, and 
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inequality. Knack and Keefer find that (WVS) trust has a positive correlation with these 
variables. La Porta et al. (1997) find that standard generalized trust measures track a very broad 
range of institutional and economic performance outcomes
2
. They argue that most organizations 
need to maintain trust among their members to function effectively: firms, nonprofits, and 
governments characterized by high trust and trustworthiness should perform better. Fukuyama 
(1995) makes a more discursive version of this argument. Higher trust enables organizations to 
grow larger since large organizations entail imperfect monitoring within the institution and 
greater reliance on norms of behavior to enforce cooperation among its members. 
Reduced-form correlations found in these classic studies hold up in later waves of the 
World Values Survey as well. The 2000 Wave for example includes a more heterogeneous range 
of countries and the additional fair question found on the General Social Survey as well. I revisit 
the findings of Knack and Keefer‘s Table 1 with data from the 2000 wave of the World Values 
Survey (aggregated), Penn World Tables national accounts data, and UNESCO cross-country 
education data. The original Knack and Keefer regressions measure performance in growth and 
investment that comes after the measurement of trust. Since I use a survey wave 19 years ahead 
of theirs, all other covariates are 19 years more recent than in that paper. Other explanatory 
variables included (per Knack and Keefer) are the proportion of eligible students enrolled in 
secondary (sec79) and primary schools in 1979 (prim79), per capita income at the beginning of 
                                                 
2
 These include efficiency of the judiciary, corruption, bureaucratic quality, tax 
compliance, civic participation, participation in professional associations, share of top 20 firms 
in GNP, adequacy/quality of infrastructure, infant mortality, high school completion, educational 
system adequacy, inflation, growth and GNP per capita. 
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the period (gdp99), and the price level of investment goods (pi99). Since the 2000 wave of 41 
countries includes many more less-developed countries than the 1981 wave, some have missing 
data on the control variables used by Knack and Keefer. I therefore estimate the coefficients 
using STATA’s multiple imputation procedure. The dependent variable in equations 1-4 of Table 
1 is average annual growth in per capita income over the 1999-2009 period. 
The results, while less precisely estimated than Knack and Keefer’s confirm that social 
capital variables are an important correlate of economic performance in this diverse panel of 
countries. Results on control variables are as expected; incomes converge conditional on other 
variables, school enrollment is positively related to growth, and investment goods prices are 
negatively related to growth. Both the WVS standard trust and fair questions show a positive 
relationship with growth over the period examined. The coefficients on WVS questions, while 
not statistically significant, are economically significant in the baseline specifications and 
qualitatively unchanged when interaction terms that allow the correlation of growth and social 
capital to differ for poor and rich countries are added. The coefficients on trust and fair in 
equations 1-4 indicate that a one standard-deviation rise in affirmative responses to either 
question is associated with a growth acceleration of around half a percentage point per annum. I 
find marginal significance for trust on Investment as a share of GDP, suggesting that higher trust 
enables higher levels of investment. Estimated coefficients on the social capital variables are of a 
similar magnitude to those in Knack and Keefer. 
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Table 1. Knack and Keefer’s regressions on new data 
 Dependent variable 
 
Growth 1999-2009 
Investment/GDP 
1999-2009 
Constant .015 .015 .012 .016 17.7 15.2 
 (.0232) (.0209) (.0243) (.0249) (7.73) (8.58) 
GDP99 -.001
**
 -.001
**
 -.001 -.001 -.040 -.023 
 (.0005) (.0005) (.0013) (.0010) (.1728) (.191) 
PRIM79 .023 .017 .021 .018 8.23 4.78 
 (.0259) (.0213) (.0254) (.0210) (8.07) (7.97) 
SEC70 .003 .003 .002 .003 4.12 6.01 
 (.0237) (.0219) (.0241) (.023) (7.88) (7.57) 
PI99 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.020 -.023 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.072) (.0842) 
WVS_Trust .030  .045  13.5
*
  
 (.0312)  (.0439)  (9.56)  
WVS_Fair  .032  .028  5.84 
  (.0255)  (.0399)  (8.96) 
Trust×GDP   -.002    
   (.0033)    
Fair×GDP    .000   
    (.0016)   
Reproduction of Knack and Keefer (1997) Table 1 using 2000 wave with new questions. Countries are Albania, 
Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Puerto Rico, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania, 
Turkey, Uganda, United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. GDP99 is the country’s GDP per capital in 
1999, PRIM79 and SEC79 are primary and secondary education enrollment rates for the eligible school age 
population in 1979. PI99 is the 1999 price index for investment goods. trust and fair are the (respondent-weighted) 
country-level averages of response to WVS trust questions. 
**
 indicates significance at 5%, 
*
 indicates significance at 
10%. 
 
Algan and Cahuc (2010) employ a compelling identification strategy to argue that 
changes in trust that predate changes in economic development can causally explain those later 
development outcomes. Since the first WVS wave comes only in 1980, Algan and Cahuc use 
General Social Survey data from the United States, but examine differences in trust question 
response for people whose grandparents, parents, or themselves immigrated from different 
countries. GSS respondents whose parents immigrated in say, 1950, are considered to have 
inherited the 1950 level of trust in the mother country. Since the cultural transmission estimation 
is done for first-, second- and third-generation Americans and compared with contemporaneous 
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responses to the corresponding WVS question in the country of origin, Algan and Cahuc then 
impute time series of trust attitudes for countries going back to the 1930s. Furthermore, they 
argue that since the imputed attitudes are inherited that they are uncontaminated by reverse 
causality. This paper corroborates and strengthens the hypothesis that higher levels of trust 
attitudes predict higher growth. 
1.3 COORDINATION AS A CANDIDATE MECHANISM? 
Economic explanations for why higher levels of generalized trust cause greater prosperity entail 
specifying how differences in these attitudes lead individuals to make different decisions in 
settings where their decisions have economic consequences. Any study of whether people who 
report themselves to be more trusting on a survey might make different decisions than their low-
trust counterparts should be grounded in what those surveyed  understand “trust” to mean. One 
definition offered by Merriam-Webster is “[a] dependence on something future or contingent.” 
This understanding comports with the incentives presented by the Stag Hunt  game. 
A summary of the stag hunt payoffs may be found in Table 2. If both players choose to 
invest then both will receive high rewards ($7). If a player chooses not to invest, she is given a 
low reward ($5) regardless of the action of her partner. Players who choose to invest but whose 
partners decline to invest receive $0. For a rational individual to invest she needs to expect that 
her partner invests as well (that is, both mutual investment and mutual disinvestment are Nash 
equilibria). Suppose that a player believes her partner will invest with probability 𝑝 and decline 
to invest with probability 1 – 𝑝. Her payoffs from investing and declining to invest, respectively, 
are 𝑝 × $7 + ( 1 – 𝑝 ) × $0 and $5. Thus a risk-neutral player is willing to invest only when the 
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probability her partner invests exceeds 𝑝 = 5/7. Summarizing the strategic uncertainty in such 
games, Chaudhuri (2009) writes “So in a way, this comes down to a question of trust after all.” 
Behavioral investigations of coordination games reveal that the Pareto-ranked outcome is 
only sometimes selected. Devetag and Ortmann (2007) survey the literature on laboratory 
coordination experiments. They find that coordination is aided by higher expected payoffs from 
the risky action, low deviation costs, more repetitions, fewer players per game, less randomness 
in matching, adding players to groups known to have coordinated before, expensive talk, cheap 
talk, richer communication, and loss-aversion. 
Table 2. Payoffs 
 Invest Don’t Invest 
Invest 7, 7 0, 5 
Don’t Invest 5, 0 5, 5 
 
1.3.1 The importance of coordination to economic prosperity 
There are many enterprises where the success of any one entrepreneur's investment depends on 
whether enough other people invest as well. The ability to coordinate on efficient investment 
opportunities has profound relevance to economic growth since new ideas, technologies and 
physical capital created by coordinated investment will increase the productive capacity of the 
economy and thus prosperity. Rodrik (1996) models a two-sector economy in general 
equilibrium. There is a low-technology sector that does not require intermediate inputs but in 
which the marginal product of labor and hence wages are low. The other sector requires 
intermediate inputs whose production exhibits increasing returns to scale. Two equilibria exist. 
One entails only the low-productivity sector being active, since the final producers cannot be 
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profitable without inputs and no firms produce inputs because no downstream firms exist to buy 
them. For the economy to realize greater productivity all firms must be coordinated. 
Coordination among individuals is also essential to the internal functioning of firms. 
Using coordination games to model productivity in worker teams has ample precedence in the 
literature. Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) implement a “minimum effort” game in the 
laboratory: players in a group can exert costly effort to produce a good, but the level of 
production is determined by the minimum effort exerted among all members in the group. This 
game’s multiple equilibria can be Pareto-ranked with higher equilibrium effort levels being more 
efficient. Social capital has also often been examined in workplace environments where we 
expect coordination to be important. Adler and Kwon (2002) summarize the literature on the 
importance of social capital to firms. Social capital strengthens networks that create initial 
matches, fosters continued success (promotion, reduced turnover), supports research and 
development and generally encourages positive spillovers. 
The observed and plausibly causal link between generalized trust attitudes and economic 
prosperity, the need for individuals to trust their partners will take complementary actions in 
order to coordinate on efficient equilibria in Stag Hunt games, and the relevance of coordination 
to growth and productivity, motivate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Trusting attitudes, as revealed in affirmative responses to the GSS trust questions, 
are positively associated with taking efficiency-supporting actions in the Stag Hunt game.  
Hypothesis 2: Trusting attitudes, as revealed in GSS questions, represent optimistic beliefs 
about partner behavior. Individuals who answer affirmatively to the GSS trust questions think 
that other people are more likely to take efficiency-supporting actions in the Stag Hunt game. 
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1.4 DESIGN 
Four sessions were conducted in the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory at the 
University of Pittsburgh. 20 undergraduate subjects per session were recruited to participate. 
Each session lasted approximately 30 minutes. The 20 participants in each session were seated 
and asked to complete an anonymous survey of demographic information and personal attitudes. 
The questions asked are a subset of those used in Glaeser et al. (2000) and are included in the 
supplementary interface screenshots. Subjects were told that they would participate in a decision-
making exercise following the survey, but were not given any specific information on the 
structure of the game before all had completed the survey. The survey questions were designed 
to elicit opinions on a variety of topics; care was taken not to prime subjects to think about trust 
issues nor have their responses to the trust questions be particularly salient in their memories. 
The survey questions of primary interest are the standard GSS “trust” question, “fair” 
question, and the GSS “help” question. While the trust and fair questions are common to the GSS 
and the WVS and referenced earlier, the help question is unique to the GSS but similar to the 
other two: 
‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves?’ 
I also measure trustworthiness on a 6-point scale and attitudinal risk preferences using a 
subset of the questions developed by Weber et al. (2002). These are discussed in Section 1.5.2. 
Following the survey, the Stag Hunt game is described to subjects. Table 2 shows the monetary 
payoffs used. The full set of instructions are available upon request. 
Ten rounds of the same Stag Hunt game are played with absolute-stranger (turnpike) 
rematching each round. This partner matching institution was chosen because the GSS questions 
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to be correlated with behavior in this game are designed to measure generalized trust between 
strangers in a society. Subjects were also instructed that following the first round, but before 
learning its outcome, they would be asked to guess how many of the other people in the room 
had invested. Correct guesses were incentivized by awarding $3.00 to anyone who guessed the 
exact number correctly and $1.50 to anyone who guessed within one person. This was done to 
measure prior beliefs as accurately as possible, since I hypothesize that more trusting people will 
have higher expectations that others will invest. All responses were entered anonymously via 
Fischbacher (2007)’s z-Tree software on the lab's computer terminals. 
Two of the ten rounds were selected at random with uniform probability for payment. All 
participants earned $3.00 for completing the survey on top of their $5.00 show-up fee. Median 
earnings in all sessions were $18.00. The minimum possible earnings for completing the 
experiment are $8.00 ($5 show-up fee, $3 survey completion fee and $0 in both selected Stag 
Hunt rounds) while maximum earnings are $25.00 ($8 + $3 guess reward + 2 × $7 in both 
selected rounds). 
1.5 RESULTS 
First-round investment frequency is below 50% in all sessions, and all sessions eventually 
converge to the risk-dominant equilibrium. This is as expected, since the payoffs used require a 
risk-neutral person to believe that her partner invests with probability greater than 5/7 for her to 
want to invest as well. Figure 1 shows how the frequency of investment for each session, and all 
sessions averaged, evolves across the 10 rounds. Figure 2 shows average investment frequencies 
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by round broken down by affirmative answers to GSS_trust, GSS_fair, GSS_help, and self-
reported trustworthiness respectively. 
The figures show that participants with affirmative answers to all of the GSS questions 
invest more often across all rounds. I explain and investigate the significance of these findings in 
the following subsections. 
 
Figure 1. Mean level of investment across rounds in all sessions 
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Figure 2. Mean level of investment by response to GSS questions 
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1.5.1 Beliefs 
Table 3 reports subjects’ average beliefs that others will invest in the first round, broken down by 
GSS survey responses as well as first-round investment frequency. Later rounds are 
contaminated by experience in previous rounds, so the first round is the most clean measure of 
the influence that beliefs have on the propensity to invest. I later utilize a structural model to 
incorporate observations from later rounds. Subjects who invest in round 1 expect that 77% of 
the other subjects in their session will do likewise; those who did not invest in the first round 
expect that only 19% of fellow session participants would invest that round. Subjects who 
answer GSS_trust in the affirmative expect that 35% of the other subjects in their session will 
invest in the first round while those who answer in the negative expect that 39% will invest; 
subjects who answer GSS_fair in the affirmative expect that 45% of the other subjects in their 
session will invest while those who answer in the negative expect that 30% will invest; and 
subjects who answer GSS_help in the affirmative expect that 44% of the other subjects in their 
session will invest while those who answer in the negative expect that 36% will invest. 
Table 3. Beliefs by first-round decision and response to GSS questions 
 Invest1 GSS_trust GSS_fair GSS_help 
Affirmative .774 .354 .453 .439 
Negative .188 .391 .303 .359 
Subject guesses about the probability that others invest in the first round, by investment choices and GSS responses. 
 
To formally test the differences found in Table 3, Table 4 displays nonparametric 
correlation coefficients and corresponding p-values between subject responses to survey 
measures (GSS_trust, _fair and _help), investing in the first round, and their elicited beliefs that 
others invest in this round (guess).  The results of these simple correlations track the results of 
Table 3. The belief that others are likely to invest is highly and significantly correlated with 
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investing oneself. The two GSS questions that show significant correlation with prior beliefs are 
GSS_fair and GSS_help. The correlation between GSS_trust and beliefs is not significantly 
different from 0. Figure 3 displays cumulative distribution functions of beliefs on how many 
others invest, broken up by affirmative/negative response to GSS questions. The horizontal axis 
on these graphs is the elicited belief about how many other people in a subject’s session will 
invest in the first round; and the height of the graph corresponding to X on the horizontal axis 
measures the cumulative proportion of affirmative / negative respondents who report that at least 
X people will invest. For example, in the panel corresponding to the GSS_fair question, about 
80% of the affirmative responders to GSS_fair believe that at least 10 other people will invest in 
the first round, while only 60% of negative responders believe that at least 10 other people will 
invest. These graphs corroborate the findings of Table 3/Table 4. The GSS_fair and GSS_help 
questions are associated with expecting more people will invest on the entire distribution of 
beliefs. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative distribution of guesses by response to GSS questions 
x
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Table 4. Beliefs by first-round decision and response to GSS questions 
 Invest1 GSS_trust GSS_fair GSS_help Trustworthy 
Guess .665
*
 -.077 .187
*
 .128
*
 .045 
 (.000) (.200) (.018) (.091) (.302) 
Kendall-tau correlations between first-round guesses, first-round investment choices and GSS trust questions; 
*
 
indicates significance at the 10% level; p-values are estimated from the simulated empirical distribution of estimates 
under the null hypothesis. 
 
While results for two of the three GSS questions are significant in the direction predicted by 
Hypothesis 2, the result on the standard (and most examined in the literature) GSS_trust question 
is not. Figure 3 and Figure 4 suggest that while those with affirmative responses to this question 
are more likely to invest, it is not due to beliefs that other subjects are more likely to invest. One 
possible resolution of these conflicting results on GSS_trust is that people with affirmative 
responses to trust attitude questions have preferences that make them more likely to choose 
investment conditional on beliefs. In Section 1.5.3, I address the consideration that these 
preferences are related to risk aversion and do not find support for that explanation. Whether 
these preferences are preferences for efficiency, altruism, as-such preferences for coordination, 
or otherwise is not knowable from these data. It is however possible to identify these preferences 
controlling for beliefs and reaction to beliefs by using a simple econometric model. 
1.5.2 The interaction with risk aversion 
Since I only measure correlations between attitudes and behavior in the Stag Hunt game, it can 
be argued that these results merely reflect omitted variables bias due to correlation between trust 
and another determinant of playing Stag. The most obvious such confound is risk aversion, but 
Neumann and Vogt (2009) show that risk preferences do not account for significant across-
subject variation in the Stag Hunt, and here I present evidence that it is not a significant 
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confound in my study either. On the survey, I include the financial risk-seeking measures from 
Weber et al. (2002), which they show to correlate with the incentivized risk- aversion procedure 
of Weber, Shafir, and Blais (2004). Figure 4 shows action choices and initial beliefs comparable 
to those presented in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively, but with each outcome measure now 
the residual from the regression of choices/beliefs on the Weber et al. questions. All qualitative 
differences between trusters and non-trusters remain unchanged after controlling for risk. To the 
extent that risk preferences are captured by the index of Weber et al. questions, they appear to 
not be a confound in this study. 
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Figure 4. Main results hold after controlling for risk attitudes 
1.5.3 Preferences 
A way to exploit the power afforded by the repeated setting used in my sessions is to posit a 
structural model for how agents update and react to beliefs – combining both action and belief 
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data. I assume that the probability that subject   attaches to her partner investing in round   is 
given: 
    
                      
 
 
where      takes on the value 1 if subject  ’s partner invests in round   and 0 if her partner does 
not and     is subject  ’s belief about the probability that others invest in the first period. Given 
these, player   adopts a cutoff strategy such that she invests when            for        
and             . Intuitively, this means that players invest when they are reasonably confident 
that others will invest (their belief exceeds their cutoff   ), and decline to invest if they believe 
others unlikely to invest (belief does not exceed   ). The    term parameterizes just how 
confident player   must be that others invest to want to invest herself: players with high   must 
be very confident that others invest before they follow suit while those with lower   require less 
reassurance that others invest before they are willing to. The model with       is a reduced 
form of a strategy that best responds to beliefs under very generic preference specifications (risk 
or social preferences may affect the utility from the game payoffs, but to the extent that the game 
remains a stag hunt in utilities, players still employ cutoff strategies in their beliefs). Relaxing 
      and specifying an extreme value distribution allows for non-systematic decision errors 
and allows us to estimate the ci using logistic regression.  
Since I am primarily concerned with individual-level heterogeneity, I estimate different 
parameters for each subject and examine whether those subjects with high trust measures feature 
greater baseline willingness to invest (conditional on beliefs) as revealed in their estimate of   . 
These are computed by estimating logistic regressions of each subject's investment decisions on 
the    . If the subject's estimated (latent) regression function is  ̂  
            , then a 
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reasonable estimate of    can be computed by        ⁄ . The estimates are summarized in Table 
5.  
Table 5. Cutoffs at which we expect indifference between investing & not, by GSS question 
 GSS_trust GSS_fair GSS_help 
 Affirm. Negative Affirm. Negative Affirm. Negative 
P ( Partner invests ) .558 .436 .448 .615 .502 .502 
2-tail MW p-value .026 .008 .408 
Corr(Cutoff, Guess) -.061 .161 .047 .047 .063 .137 
 (.340) (.049) (.327) (.341) (.286) (.111) 
Average probability of their partner investing at which subject groups are indifferent between investing and not 
investing. these were estimated individually by logit regression on beliefs/history of play. If ŷi
*
 = β0i + β1i beliefi is the 
estimated regression for subject i then the belief at which they are indifferent between investing and not is -β0i / β1i. 
Mann-Whitney ranksum tests between affirmative and negative responders to the GSS questions were performed on 
the resulting estimates and p-values are reported below the (averaged) estimates. Corr(Cutoff, Guess) is the 
estimated kendall tau correlation between subject guesses about how many people invest in round 1 and and their 
estimated cutoffs; two-tailed p-values for the null hypothesis that Corr(Cutoff, Guess) = 0 are in parentheses. 
 
Subjects who answer in the affirmative to GSS_trust have significantly higher thresholds 
than their negatively responding counterparts, while affirmative respondents to GSS_fair have a 
significantly lower threshold required to invest than their negatively-responding counterparts. 
Specifically, while affirmative respondents to GSS_trust will only invest when they believe 
others will invest with greater than probability .56, negative respondents invest when they 
believe their partners invest with at least .44 probability. Affirmative respondents to GSS_fair 
will invest when they believe others invest with probability at least .45, negative respondents 
only invest when they believe their partners invest with at least .62 probability. There are no 
significant differences in thresholds between affirmative and negative responders to GSS_help. 
Mann-Whitney rank sum p-values are reported in Table 5. 
While the estimated thresholds indicate that affirmative responders to GSS_fair would be 
more likely to invest even controlling for their higher beliefs that others invest; affirmative 
responders to GSS_trust have neither higher beliefs that others invest nor greater willingness to 
invest controlling for beliefs. Why then do affirmative responders to GSS_trust appear to invest 
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more often on average than their negatively-responding counterparts? The third row of Table 5 
provides an explanation. The only significant correlation found between beliefs that others invest 
in round 1 and subjects' own threshold required to invest is for negative responders to GSS_trust. 
Intuitively, this means that while the negative respondents to GSS_trust seem to have similar 
beliefs and lower threshold cutoffs as the affirmative respondents, they appear to believe that 
other subjects have significantly higher thresholds than they do; this may explain why 
affirmative responders to GSS_trust invest more frequently. 
1.6 DISCUSSION 
Evidence from the Stag Hunt experiment I conduct provide preliminary evidence that social 
capital, as measured through trust questions, predicts coordination on Pareto-dominant equilibria. 
Hence, surveys on trust measure an important facet of social capital: coordination. It is 
furthermore clear that players' expectations of what other players will do is a significant predictor 
of behavior and that two of the GSS questions capture this motive. In addition, the standard trust 
question, as well as GSS_fair (both also on the World Values Survey) predict a preference for 
coordinating conditional on beliefs. The qualitative findings on coordination preferences and 
beliefs by question are consistent with Thöni et al. (2010) as well. The finding that trust attitudes 
are operative in the Stag Hunt also sheds light on why trust surveys are found to have a 
relationship to contributions in public goods games (Anderson, Mellor and Milyo, 2004; Thöni, 
et al., 2010). The findings here corroborate those in the Thöni et al. study to a great extent. In 
that paper, only the GSS_trust (and not _fair) question is found to correlate with higher 
contributions to a linear public good, but that only the GSS_fair question (and not _trust) is 
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positively related to beliefs about others’ contributions. Coordination and linear public good with 
conditional contribution opportunities share many common features, and in fact most of Thöni et 
al.’s subjects have contribution schedules that imply they are effectively playing a coordination 
game. Since solving both free-riding and coordination problems are necessary in the provision of 
public goods, my paper contributes to the literature on why more trusting people are able to 
provide more public goods. This leaves open the question of how these two environments (public 
goods and the Stag Hunt) differ from the classical trust game of Berg et al. (1995), where the 
relationship between survey and behavioral trust is weak or absent. 
Lastly, it should be the goal of this research agenda to take what we know about how 
social capital operates back into the field. If we can establish both that exogenous increases in 
trust improve economic outcomes, and that these positive outcomes do indeed feed back into 
trust, we will be one step closer to explaining elusive cross-country variance in development and 
human welfare. 
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2.0  THE IMPORTANCE OF HIGHER-ORDER BELIEFS TO SUCCESSFUL 
COORDINATION 
Beliefs about other players’ strategies are crucial in determining outcomes for coordination 
games. If players are to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium, they must believe that others will 
coordinate with them. In many settings there is uncertainty about beliefs as well as strategies. Do 
people consider these ‘higher-order’ beliefs (beliefs about beliefs) when making coordination 
decisions? I design a modified Stag Hunt experiment that allows me to identify how these 
higher-order beliefs and uncertainty about higher-order beliefs matter for coordination. Players 
prefer to invest especially when they believe that others are ‘optimistic’ that they will invest; but 
knowledge that others think them unlikely to invest does not cause players to behave differently 
than when they do not know what their partners think about them. Thus resolving uncertainty 
about beliefs can result in marked efficiency gains. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A vast swathe of economic activity is achieved by coordination among agents, sustained in 
equilibrium by mutually reinforcing beliefs. Product manufacturers expect inputs to be produced 
by upstream firms, who in turn must count on the custom of these downstream manufacturers to 
profitably produce those inputs. Potential investors in a start-up venture will only invest if they 
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expect that the entrepreneur will successfully raise capital from other investors like them. Entire 
economies can fall into traps where expectations of low incomes lead firms and individuals to 
forego production and investment that could be profitable under a different set of expectations. 
For concreteness, let us focus on a model that captures the strategic incentives present in 
the situations above in their most essential form: a stag hunt game. In a stag hunt game, players 
have the opportunity to invest in a speculative venture that will be profitable only if a sufficient 
proportion of other players do likewise. If a player has a sufficiently strong belief that others will 
invest, then she will also want to invest, making mutual investment a Nash equilibrium. If she 
places low probability on others investing, then she will also decline to invest. Thus mutual 
disinvestment is also a Nash equilibrium.  
How do people form the expectations that lead them into better or worse equilibria? The 
introspective player will reason that since potential partners face the same incentives that she 
does, they will invest when they expect her to invest. In this way, her beliefs about others' 
actions (what game theorists term first-order beliefs) are crucially informed by her beliefs about 
others' beliefs (second-order beliefs, naturally). 
Do people make these considerations when deciding whether to invest or not in stag hunt 
games? Experimental implementations of global games, specifically stag hunt games with 
uncertainty about payoffs, should provide us some evidence (Heinemann et al., 2004; Cabrales et 
al. 2007; Heinemann and Cornand, 2011). Uncertainty about payoffs to coordination can, under 
Bayesian reasoning, select a unique equilibrium (Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993). This works 
because when a subject has low beliefs about the fundamental payoffs, she expects others do as 
well, that those other players are unlikely to invest, and that they are making the same 
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consideration about her. Global games experiments generally do not observe strong differences 
across information treatments however.  
I design a modified stag hunt game that features exogenous uncertainty about actions 
rather than payoffs. Players' actions are subject to exogenous perturbations with objectively 
known probabilities. I experimentally manipulate players' expectations that their partner will 
invest in the modified stag hunt but revealing information about the exogenous perturbations 
(first-order beliefs); this allows me to also manipulate players' second-order beliefs by revealing 
what their partners know about their probability of investment. Since the perturbations are 
independently assigned, I can identify how people respond to induced changes in their second-
order beliefs. Careful elicitation of subjects' first- and second-order beliefs confirms that the 
experimental treatments operate through the hypothesized belief mechanism. The paper proceeds 
as follows: existing literature on stag hunt games is surveyed in Section 2.2, Section 2.3 outlines 
a model that predicts how rational players respond to changes in second-order beliefs, Section 
2.4 describes the design of the experiment in detail, Section 2.5 summarizes the collected data, 
Section 2.6 presents the results of the experiment and Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
The theoretical and experimental analysis of coordination shows that beliefs are an extremely 
important determinant of behavior in coordination games (Devetag and Ortmann, 2007); but to 
not model where they come from is akin to saying that technology is an important determinant of 
growth but neglecting to model whence technological progress stems – indisputably true but 
nevertheless unsatisfying. Is common knowledge of a belief important in sustaining that belief? 
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This question is of great importance in organizing how we think about coordination in 
heterogeneous societies, but we cannot answer it without knowing how higher-order beliefs 
influence human decision making. 
The importance of higher-order beliefs to coordination is closely related with the notion 
of how global games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993) yield equilibrium refinements in these 
games. This theory states that under an arbitrarily small level of uncertainty about the game 
payoffs, perfect higher-order reasoning implies that only the risk-dominant equilibrium survives 
iterated deletion of dominated strategies. In a “global” Stag Hunt investment game, players do 
not know the precise payoff from investing, but share a common prior belief distribution about 
what it is. Each player receives private information that narrows the possible range of investment 
payoffs. Morris and Shin (2003) emphasize that global games yield equilibrium selection results 
precisely because they generate higher-order uncertainty about partner strategies. Global games 
shed light on the role that higher-order beliefs play in coordination because, to the extent that 
people reason in higher orders, they should react to the higher-order beliefs they form. Different 
private signals in a global game induce changes in higher-order beliefs because a player cannot 
know what other players think about the signal that she herself received. In a Stag Hunt global 
game with payoff uncertainty and private signals about payoffs, if I observe the payoff from 
coordinated investment to be high, there is still some probability that my partner thinks that I 
observed it to be low. The distribution of the signal induces a distribution of higher-order beliefs 
given preferences. If preferences are risk-neutral, Bayesian players should invest only when 
investment is risk-dominant. 
We cannot identify how higher-order beliefs influence human decision making without 
the level of control and observation permissible in a laboratory experiment. Unfortunately, the 
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experimental results from global games call into question whether human subjects respond to 
induced changes in higher-order beliefs. Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004) test the 
comparative static predictions of global games theory in an n-player Stag Hunt by comparing 
sessions with public signals about the threshold number of players required to support the risky 
action to those with private signals of this parameter. While many comparative statics are 
consistent with global games theory, they do not find significant differences between public and 
private information conditions. Cabrales, Nagel, and Armenter (2007) examine Stag Hunts with 
deterministic versus random payoffs with private signals. They find significant differences 
between the public and private information treatments for only one of two parameterizations. 
The global games literature provides very weak evidence on the impact of higher-order beliefs. 
Neither Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels nor Cabrales, Nagel, and Armenter find comparative 
statics that are not also consistent with players simply preferring to invest when payoffs from 
successful coordination are higher. Heinemann and Cornand (2011) conduct a similar study in 
which agents’ optimal choices in the Morris and Shin (2002) game are a mix between a public 
and private signal. They find subjects under-react to the public relative to the private signal and 
hypothesize that finite levels of higher-order reasoning may be responsible. 
The problem with implementing global games as a way to examine the role of higher-order 
beliefs in coordination games is that higher-order beliefs are only changed by manipulating 
payoffs to investment, and there is a long literature showing the effects of payoff changes on 
investment behavior in these games (again, see Devetag and Ortmann, 2007 for a comprehensive 
review). It is important to establish both that human reasoning about coordination takes place at 
higher orders, and to investigate how this reasoning works by directly examining changes in 
beliefs. In the next section I lay out an innovative experimental design that manipulates second-
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order beliefs without changing investment payoffs and measures precisely how induced changes 
in second-order beliefs affect first-order beliefs and investment behavior. 
2.3 THEORETICAL SETUP 
In this section I sketch a simple argument demonstrating how higher order beliefs 
influence investment behavior in a coordination game. Consider the Stag Hunt game of 
Table 6: 
Table 6. A Stag Hunt game with H > L > 0 
 Invest Don’t Invest 
Invest H, H 0, L 
Don’t Invest L, 0 L, L 
 
Each agent chooses to ‘invest’ or ‘not invest’. If both agents invest then both will receive a high 
return H. If an agent chooses not to invest, she earns a low return L regardless of whether the 
other person invests or not. Agents who invest but whose counterparts do not will lose their 
investment. Both Invest, Invest and Not invest, Not invest are Nash equilibria, and though only 
Invest, Invest is efficient, a risk-neutral player must believe that her counterpart invests with 
probability greater than L/H to want to invest. What considerations lead to these beliefs? In 
classical game theory, beliefs are consistent in equilibrium and yield infinite hierarchies of 
beliefs (Harsanyi, 1967-68). In the context of coordination, a player will consider her partner 
more likely to invest if she expects that her partner expects her to invest. If and only if a rational 
player’s belief that the other will invest exceeds some threshold determined by her risk 
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preferences will that player invest
3
. This consideration forms the basis for reasoning about 
behavior in this game. Thus, for a player to form a first-order belief that models her partner’s 
investment choice, she must form a belief about her partner’s beliefs and about her partner’s 
preferences. I take as given, a belief about her partner’s belief and her partner’s preferences, 
which in turn induce her first-order belief (the probability she thinks that her partner will invest). 
Of course we may similarly ask where second-order beliefs come from, and posit (like Harsanyi) 
that if an extra step of strategic reasoning takes place, then second-order beliefs are themselves 
derived from third-order beliefs and what players think their partner thinks about their 
preferences. There is an extensive literature that models human strategic behavior as comprising 
a finite but arbitrary number of iterated reasoning steps (I think that you think that I think that 
you think, etc.) (e.g. Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004). The theoretical 
argument for why second-order beliefs induce first-order beliefs (to be laid out formally in this 
                                                 
3 We maintain the following assumptions: subjects treat the choice to invest as a simple 
lottery with subjective probabilities over the possible outcomes (0 or H); players prefer to invest 
when their partner invests with probability 1 and prefer not to invest when there is 0 probability 
their partner invests (each lottery first-order stochastically dominates the other in these two 
cases); and players’ preferences obey the continuity axiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern. 
Since not investing is preferred to investing when your partner fails to invest, and investing is 
preferred to not investing when your partner invests, the continuity axiom implies that there is 
some probability of one’s partner investing below which players will prefer not to invest, above 
which players will prefer to invest, and at which they will be indifferent between investing and 
not investing. 
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section) is exactly mirrored in how third-order beliefs would induce second-order beliefs (and 
fourth third, etc.) if additional reasoning steps take place. This paper examines whether people 
reason at the second-order in coordination, and so for illustrative purposes we take a player’s 
second-order belief as given. 
Since the investment game is symmetric, without loss of generality we consider the 
decision of one agent who we denote Investor 1, in reaction to her counterpart investor, who we 
denote Investor 2. Let Investor 1 have second-order belief ρ1, i.e. Investor 1 expects that Investor 
2 thinks that Investor 1 will invest with probability ρ1, and fail to invest with probability 1 − ρ1. 
Investor 1 is uncertain of the exact parameterization of Investor 2’s preferences. Investor 2 will 
invest if she thinks that Investor 1 will invest with at least probability c2, and decline to invest if 
she thinks that Investor 1 will invest with less than probability c2. Investor 1 of course does not 
know what c2 is, but has some sense of what it is that we formally model with cumulative 
distribution function F1. ρ1 and F1 induce Investor 1’s first-order belief that Investor 2 will 
invest: Investor 1 believes that Investor 2 will invest with probability F1 ( ρ1 ), and will fail to 
invest with probability 1 − F1 ( ρ1 ). Since F1 is a cumulative distribution function, it is clear that 
Investor 1’s first-order belief F1( ρ1 ) is increasing in her second-order belief ρ1. Investor 1, 
adopting a cutoff strategy herself, will invest if she believes that Investor 2 will invest with 
probability at least c1
4
. Player 1 will invest if F1 ( ρ1 ) ≥ c1 and decline to invest if F1 ( ρ1 ) < c1.
 
There exists threshold ρ1* such that Investor 1 will invest if her second-order belief, ρ1, is 
at least ρ1* and will decline to invest if ρ1 < ρ1*.  
                                                 
4 Note that the three Nash equilibria of this game are Invest, Invest; Not invest, Not invest; 
and Investment with probabilities c2 and c1., respectively. 
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Sketch of proof: Let F1 be continuous. Since not investing is preferred to investing if 
Investor 2 invests with less than c1 probability, and investing is preferred to not investing when 
Investor 2 invests with probability c1 or greater, then the continuity axiom and the intermediate 
value theorem imply that there is some probability F1 ( ρ1* ) of Investor 2 investing below which 
Investor 1 prefers not to invest, above which she prefers to invest, and at which she is indifferent. 
In Section 2.4, I lay out an experimental design for the investment game that can induce 
changes in second-order beliefs while holding constant all other strategic elements. 
2.4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PREDICTIONS 
I develop four treatments to experimentally induce variation in second-order beliefs and analyze 
their impact on investment. All treatments implement a modified version of the Stag Hunt game 
whose payoffs are given in Table 7. 
Table 7. Payoffs 
 Invest Don’t Invest 
Invest 18, 18 0, 10 
Don’t Invest 10, 0 10, 10 
 
Subjects must choose to either invest or not invest. No investment guarantees a payoff of $10, 
while investment only pays when the subjects’ partner does likewise. The subject must expect 
her partner to invest to choose it over not investing, which carries no risk. The actions chosen by 
each player are subject to uncertainty: chosen actions only sometimes correspond to the same 
final action. Final actions determine payoffs. That is, there is some probability that those who 
intend to invest fail to successfully do so, and those who intend not to invest may find 
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themselves by twist of fate in fact investing. This process is described to subjects as the outcome 
of a fair coin flip and an independent six-sided die roll. If the coin comes up heads then that 
person’s investment probability is high: if a 5 or 6 is rolled, the person’s final action will be 
investment; 1-4 do not modify the player’s chosen action. If the coin comes up tails then that 
person’s investment probability is low: if a 5 or 6 is rolled the final action will be non-
investment; 1-4 do not modify the player’s chosen action. Table 8 summarizes how noise is 
operative in all possible cases: 
Table 8. The action carried out as a function of subjects’ choice and uncertainty 
 Die roll 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Coin 
flip 
Heads (high investment probability) 
Choice is not modified 
Invest 
Tails (low investment probability) Not invest 
 
The uncertainty in how subjects’ chosen actions are carried out as final actions is 
necessary to induce controlled changes in beliefs. The difference between treatments lies in the 
information investors have about whether their partner’s investment probability is high or low, as 
well as the information they have on their own investment probability. In Treatment BK (both 
know), subjects know their own investment probability and their partners know this as well; in 
Treatment PK (partner knows) subjects do not know their own investment probability but their 
partner does (and by symmetry their know their partner’s); in Treatment IK (I know) subjects 
know their own investment probability but their partner does not (nor they their partner’s); and in 
Treatment NK (neither knows) neither subject nor their partner knows their investment 
probability. Subjects are made fully aware of the information structure of the treatment they 
participate in. Beliefs are elicited before information about the round is revealed. Table 9 
summarizes the design of this experiment. Knowing whether one’s partner has a high or low 
investment probability will make a potential investor more optimistic or pessimistic that the 
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partner will indeed invest. Since the attractiveness of investing is weakly increasing in the belief 
that one’s partner invests, optimistic investors will be more likely to invest than investors who 
don’t know their partner’s investment probability, who in turn will be more likely to invest than 
pessimistic investors. Less obviously, knowing one’s own investment probability can induce 
what shall henceforth be referred to as second-order-optimism (second-order-pessimism): the 
knowledge that your partner is optimistic (pessimistic) about you. 
Treatments BK and PK implement three distinct information sets that differ only in what 
subjects know about their partner’s beliefs (partner’s beliefs optimistic, partner’s beliefs 
pessimistic, partner’s beliefs unknown). If investors have strategic models of their partners, then 
they should recognize that differing beliefs held by their partner will cause that partner to be 
more or less likely to invest herself. Treatments IK and NK implement appropriate controls for 
Treatments BK and PK because the same information provided in Treatment BK (relative to not 
knowing this information in Treatment PK) does not give rise to changes in beliefs that are 
predicted to generate a behavioral response. Investors should not condition on their own 
investment probability because (since their partner cannot see this) it does not change their 
partner’s beliefs. Hence using the 2-by-2 treatment design we will be able to test for the role of 
second-order beliefs. While information on a person’s own investment probability should have 
no effect on behavior in the IK/NK comparison, it should have a substantial effect in the BK/PK 
comparison. 
Table 9. Information structure of the treatments 
 Do you know… 
 Your investment prob. Partner’s investment prob. 
Treatment BK YES YES 
Treatment PK NO YES 
Treatment IK YES NO 
Treatment NK NO NO 
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2.4.1 Predictions 
Invest, Invest and Not invest, Not invest remain Nash equilibria under all joint investment 
probability realizations in all treatments if preferences are risk-neutral. Invest, Invest also 
remains efficient relative to Not invest, Not invest since expected payoffs in the Invest, Invest 
equilibrium are higher than those in the Not invest, Not invest equilibrium. Our simple model of 
Section 2.3 additionally generates out-of-equilibrium predictions (i.e. when beliefs are not 
consistent). Predictions are broken out by treatment. Without loss of generality, we consider 
Investor 1 playing the modified coordination game of this section with Investor 2. Investor 1 has 
incomplete knowledge of Investor 2’s beliefs as well as incomplete knowledge of what 
probability would make Investor 2 indifferent between investing and not in- vesting; but has 
subjective prior beliefs that we denote ρ1 and F1 as before. 
Let us examine the predicted behavior in each of the treatments. We start with Treatment 
NK since players receive no information on investment probabilities in that treatment. Note now 
that since final actions and not chosen actions are strategically relevant, Investor 1 should think 
that Investor 2 expects her to (finally) invest with probability ⅔ρ1 + ⅙. Investor 2 will invest if 
and only if ⅔ρ1 + ⅙ > c2, so the probability that Investor 2 will choose to invest is F1( ⅔ρ1 + ⅙ ) 
and hence the final probability that Investor 2 invests is ⅔ F1 ( ⅔ρ1 + ⅙ ) + ⅙. 
In Treatment IK, Investor 1 learns her own investment probability, but knows that this 
information is not known by Investor 2. Her belief in the final investment probability of Investor 
2 therefore remains ⅔ F1 ( ⅔ρ1 + ⅙ ) + ⅙. 
In Treatment PK, Investor 1 learns what investor 2’s investment probability is. Since 
Investor 2 does not know her own investment probability, Investor 1’s model of Investor 2’s 
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beliefs should remain unchanged relative to baseline ( ⅔ρ1 + ⅙ ). Investor 2’s final investment 
probability depends on her investment probability, which Investor 1 knows. Suppose that she 
observes Investor 2’s investment probability to be high and so she is optimistic. This means that 
the final investment probability is ⅔ F1 ( ⅔ρ1 + ⅙ ) + ⅓. If Investor 1 had instead observed 
Investor 2’s investment probability to be low, then she would be pessimistic and her belief would 
be ⅔ F1 ( ⅔ρ1 + ⅙ ). 
In Treatment BK, Investor 1 learns her own investment probability, which means that her 
posterior weight on Investor 2 investing depends on both her own investment probability and 
Investor 2’s. Since Investor 1 knows what Investor 2 knows about her investment probability, 
this will be incorporated into her model of Investor 2’s beliefs. If her own investment probability 
is high, then Investor 2 will have belief ⅔ρ1 + ⅓ and if it is low the belief will be ⅔ρ1. We denote 
these as second-order optimism and second-order pessimism, respectively. High vs. low partner 
investment probability changes Investor 1’s first-order beliefs by the same reasoning as in 
Treatment PK. The final investment probability for Investor 2 in all treatment is given in Table 
10. Since the likelihood of investment is weakly increasing in the belief that one’s partner will 
invest, our belief predictions generate the following comparative static predictions for 
investment. 
Hypothesis 1: All else equal, players who are second-order optimistic in Treatment BK will be 
more likely to invest than players in Treatment PK who have similar information about their 
partner’s investment probability. On the other hand, players who are second-order pessimistic 
will be less likely to invest than their counterparts in Treatment B. 
Hypothesis 2: All else equal, subjects in Treatment IK invest with the same frequency as subjects 
in Treatment NK. While subjects in Treatment IK observe their own investment probability, this 
 38 
induces neither second-order-optimism nor second-order-pessimism as subjects realize that their 
partner does not know this information. 
Table 10. Player 1’s beliefs that her partner’s final action is investment, by her own investment probability and her 
partner’s investment probability in all treatments 
 Player 1’s investment 
probability 
Player 2’s investment probability 
 High Low 
Treatment BK 
High 
⅔ F₁  ( ⅔ Ρ₁  + ⅓ ) + 
⅓ 
⅔ F1 ( ⅔ Ρ1 + ⅓ ) 
Low ⅔ F₁  ( ⅔ Ρ₁  ) + ⅓ ⅔ F1 ( ⅔ Ρ1 ) 
Treatment PK 
High ⅔ F₁  ( ⅔ Ρ₁  + ⅙ ) + 
⅓ 
⅔ F₁  ( ⅔ Ρ₁  + ⅙ ) 
Low 
Treatment IK 
High 
⅔ F₁  ( ⅔ Ρ₁  + ⅙ ) + ⅙ 
Low 
Treatment NK 
High 
⅔ F₁  ( ⅔ Ρ₁  + ⅙ ) + ⅙ 
Low 
 
2.5 DATA 
Sessions of each treatment have subjects play 10 rounds of the modified Stag Hunt with random 
rematching between rounds. Eight sessions were conducted in the Pittsburgh Experimental 
Economics Laboratory (PEEL) at the University of Pittsburgh. Three sessions each of treatments 
BK and PK are implemented, as are one session each of treatments IK and NK
5
. Twenty 
undergraduate subjects per session were recruited to participate. The total number of subjects per 
treatment is shown in Table 11. All subjects were recruited from the general population of the 
                                                 
5 Per Table 10, Treatment BK has four times as many strategically distinct cells as 
Treatments IK/NK, and twice as many as Treatment PK. Sample sizes were chosen with the goal 
of distinguishing predicted treatment differences with reasonable power. 
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PEEL participant database. Each session lasted approximately 80 minutes. The 20 participants in 
each session are seated and read the instructions. Following the instructions there is a short 
comprehension quiz that all subjects are required to complete before any decision-making 
begins. All participants earn a $5.00 show-up fee. 
Table 11. Sessions 
Treatment BK PK IK NK 
# of subjects 3 3 1 1 
# of subjects per session 20 20 20 20 
Total # of subjects 60 60 20 20 
# of rounds per session 10 10 10 10 
 
The instructions start by telling subjects that they will participate in 10 rounds, and that 
each round consists of a Decision Task, followed by Estimation Task 1, and then by Estimation 
Task 2. Only one component of each round is paid: one randomly selected round of the Decision 
Task, a different randomly selected round of Estimation Task 1, and yet another randomly 
selected round of Estimation Task 2
6
. Then the Decision Task (the investment game) is described 
to subjects. Subjects are matched with a randomly selected partner from the room each round. 
Table 7 shows the monetary payoffs used. The full set of instructions are available upon request. 
Subjects are made aware of the transformation of their choices into final actions, and 
what information they will be able to see. Again, in Treatment BK subjects are informed whether 
                                                 
6 This design was chosen primarily to minimize the concern that subjects can hedge by 
stating beliefs different from their true ones. Subjects’ payoff from the Decision Task of round t 
depends on the probability their partner chooses to invest that round, denoted pt: ⅔ pt + ⅙. Note 
that Corr( ⅔ pt + ⅙, pt ) ≥ Corr( ⅔ pt + ⅙, p-t ) for beliefs pt, p-t that differ at all between periods t, 
-t. Higher correlation between payoffs presents a greater incentive to hedge. 
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their and their partner’s investment probabilities are high or low before making their choices, 
while in Treatment PK they are only informed of their partner’s investment probability. In 
Treatment IK they are only informed of their own investment probability; and in Treatment NK 
they do not learn any investment probability information before making their decisions. The joint 
sequence of partner matchings, investment probability realizations and whether choices actually 
become modified before they are carried out as final actions was randomly generated ex-ante and 
was constant across sessions. 
Following the decision task in Treatments BK/PK subjects are told how many people in 
the room (besides themselves) are optimistic, and how many are pessimistic. Subjects are asked 
to guess the number of each group choosing to invest in the preceding Decision Task. If they 
guess the exact number of people who actually chose to invest among people who are optimistic 
they earn $1.50, otherwise they earn $0. Likewise if they guess the exact number of people who 
actually chose to invest among people who are pessimistic they earn $1.50, otherwise they earn 
$0. In Treatments IK/NK subjects are simply asked how many people in the room invested (as all 
subjects are neither optimistic nor pessimistic in Treatments IK/NK) and rewarded $3.00 if and 
only if their guess is correct
7
. We take the elicited fractions choosing to invest as measures of 
subjects’ probabilistic beliefs that their partner will invest in the relevant case8. Subjects are also 
                                                 
7 We do not elicit counterfactual beliefs about how many people would invest if they 
knew their partner's investment frequency as no one in sessions of treatments IK and NK ever 
had this information – making incentivized elicitation impossible. 
8 Since all subjects are matched randomly we can think of this number as the probability 
that one’s partner will choose to invest since partners are a random draw from this set of 19. This 
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reminded what their guesses imply about the potentially modified final investment actions of 
their partners. 
Estimation Task 2 asks subjects what they believe other people responded to Estimation 
Task 1. All of the possible responses to each component of Estimation Task 1 are listed in rows, 
and subjects must guess the number of people in the room (themselves excluded) that gave that 
response to Estimation Task 1
9
. The computer software ensures that subjects’ responses add up 
to the total number of other people in the room. Like in Estimation Task 1, if subjects guess the 
actual number of people giving a particular response then they earn $0.25 per correct guess but 
$0 otherwise. There are 22 total such guessing tasks in Estimation Task 2, meaning that subjects 
could earn up to $5.50 for exactly correct second-order guesses. 
Average earnings in all sessions were $17.42 including show-up payment. The minimum 
possible earnings for completing the experiment is the $5 show-up payment (everyone made 
more than this) while maximum earnings are $31.50 ($5 + $18 in the Decision Task + $3 in 
Estimation Task 1 + $5.50 in Estimation Task 2). 
                                                                                                                                                             
method of belief elicitation is preferable to a proper scoring rule (e.g. quadratic scoring) because 
scoring rules are only incentive compatible under very specific forms of risk preferences. 
Incentivizing only correct guesses is robust to risk aversion. A proof of the incentive-
compatibility of this elicitation mechanism may be found in Appendix A. 
9 This elicitation mechanism draws strong inspiration from the work of Neri and Manski 
(2012). 
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2.6 RESULTS 
As we seek to understand the decisions and beliefs of human investors, we refer here only to 
chosen actions and elicited beliefs about these choices, not final actions that may result from a 
modification of that choice. 
2.6.1 Summary 
Summary graphs of investment frequency can be found in Figure 5. There are four possible joint 
realizations of own and partner investment probabilities for any given subject. Investment 
frequencies are reported by which of these cases a given decision was made under; note that a 
subject will face different cases across rounds so round-to-round variability in each series is 
partially driven by variable composition of the group of subjects facing that particular noise 
realization (though the sequence of noise realizations across all sessions was identical). 
In Treatment NK, subjects are unaware of both their own investment probability and that 
of their partner. Thus, we should not expect to see any differences in investment frequency 
between own or partner investment probability. This corresponds to what we see in the data, with 
no persistent differences and a high level of variation that decreases slightly in later rounds. 
Investment rates decline from over 50% to an average of around 30%. 
The graph of investment frequency for Treatment IK tells a similar story. While subjects 
in this treatment observe their own investment probability, they do not see that of their partner – 
hence information on their own investment probability is not strategically relevant. 
If subjects reacted to this information for other reasons, we would see noticeable 
differences in investment between the upward-pointing triangles (high own investment 
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probability) and downward-pointing triangles (own investment probability low), but we do not. 
Investment levels hover around 50% in all noise realizations, albeit with wide variation. The 
large variation is most likely caused by small numbers of subjects in each of the joint investment 
probability cells in treatments IK and NK (on average 5). 
Since subjects can see their partner’s investment probability, the graph of Treatment PK 
investment levels is one where we should expect to see differences in investment behavior across 
information, and do. Subjects who observe that their partner’s investment probability is high (the 
solid triangles, optimistic) are around 20% more likely to invest than those who observed their 
partner’s investment probability to be low (unfilled triangles, pessimistic). It is this difference 
that provides the foundation for differences in investment levels between subjects who are 
second- order-optimistic and those who are second-order-pessimistic in Treatment BK; since 
they can expect their partners to respond to the observed investment probability. Since subjects 
do not know their own investment probability, we do not expect nor find differential investment 
behavior between subjects whose own investment probability was high (upward-pointing 
triangles) and those for whom it was low (downward-pointing triangles) in Treatment PK. 
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Figure 5. Investment frequencies by treatment and investment probability 
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Investment probabilities in Treatment BK are common knowledge, and thus Treatment 
BK displays a clear separation of investment levels among all four investment probability 
realizations. Like in Treatment PK, optimistic subjects (solid triangles) invest up to 40% more 
frequently than pessimistic subjects (unfilled triangles) in Treatment BK. This difference is larger 
in magnitude than the corresponding difference from Treatment PK, as we might expect it to 
be
10
.
 
Second-order-optimistic subjects (upward-pointing triangles) are 10-15% more likely to 
invest than second- order-pessimistic ones (downward-pointing triangles). Thus, we see that 
induced changes in first-order beliefs have a first-order effect on investment behavior while the 
induced changes in second-order beliefs had a comparably second-order effect on investment 
frequency. 
In order to make these second-order effects more apparent, the next figure pools 
investment decisions over high or low partner investment probability but separates cases of high 
or low own investment probability. The left-hand pane of Figure 6 shows the investment 
frequencies from both treatments BK and PK. Treatment BK data is separated by whether own 
investment probability is high (upward-pointing triangles), or low (downward-pointing 
triangles), while Treatment PK data is pooled as subjects do not know their own investment 
probability (circles). It appears that subjects who know that their own investment probability is 
high (second-order- optimistic) are significantly more likely to invest than subjects who know 
that their own investment probability is low or those who do not know their own investment 
probability – who invest with about the same frequency. This is intriguing; it suggests that not 
knowing one’s own investment probability generates the same behavior as knowing that it is 
                                                 
10 Refer to Section 2.6.5 for a detailed and quantitative treatment of why this is might be. 
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low. Would we expect this result using our model of Sections 2.3/2.4.1? I examine whether 
observed investment patterns are explained by beliefs in the next subsection, and whether they 
are explained by a combination of beliefs and preferences in Section 2.6.5. 
The right-hand pane of Figure 6 is a comparable graph of data from treatments IK and 
NK. Subjects in Treatment IK invest about as frequently as those in Treatment NK, regardless of 
whether they know their own investment probability to be high or low. 
 
Figure 6. Investment frequencies by own investment probability, pooling across partner investment probability 
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2.6.2 Beliefs 
To strengthen our inference on the role of second-order beliefs, we proceed to examine whether 
there is evidence that observed differences in investment frequencies can be explained by how 
the treatments induce changes in beliefs. Beliefs are elicited every round; Appendix B describes 
how subjects update beliefs across all rounds. Figure 7 shows CDFs of elicited second-order 
beliefs in all four treatments, with CDFs of elicited  
first-order beliefs shown for comparison purposes. Treatments BK and PK (the left and right 
panes of the top row, respectively) have second-order beliefs broken down by whether subjects 
were trying to predict the beliefs of their optimistic counterparts or pessimistic counterparts. 
First-order beliefs were elicited separately for these two groups, so four CDFs per treatment are 
shown for comparison: the expected distribution of first-order beliefs for optimistic investors, the 
actual distribution of first-order beliefs for optimistic investors, the expected distribution of first-
order beliefs for pessimistic investors, and the actual distribution of first-order beliefs for 
pessimistic investors. Since subjects receive no feedback on belief accuracy until all decisions 
have been made, beliefs are surprisingly accurate. As seen in the rightward shift of the 
distribution of guesses about guesses relative to that of elicited first-order beliefs, subjects 
generally tend to think that others place greater likelihood on their partners investing than those 
others actually do. This could be driven by subjects thinking (on average) that other people are 
more optimistic than they are. In addition, as seen by the steeper slope of the CDF of guesses 
about guesses relative to that of elicited first-order beliefs, subjects also tend to think that others’ 
beliefs are more tightly distributed than they are in actuality. Most importantly however, is the 
finding that subjects expect other subjects to respond to partner investment probability. This 
means that subjects who observe their own investment probability to be high in Treatment BK 
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think their partners place a higher likelihood on them investing. Subjects in Treatment PK would 
of course display this pattern of beliefs if they could observe their own investment probability – 
this is why elicited beliefs in Treatment PK look the same as those from Treatment BK. The 
bottom row of Figure 7 shows elicited second- order beliefs from treatments IK (left pane) and 
NK (right pane) graphed with actual first-order belief distributions for comparison. Since 
subjects in Treatments IK/PK do not observe their partner’s investment probability, second (like 
first-) order beliefs are not broken down by optimism/pessimism. We do see, like in treatments 
BK and PK that on average subjects think that others are more optimistic than they themselves 
are and that generally beliefs about beliefs tend to be less diffuse than the actual distribution of 
(first-order) beliefs. 
Induced changes in second-order beliefs induce changes in first-order beliefs as is 
theoretically predicted. That is, since subjects believe that the beliefs of their optimistic 
counterparts are indeed more optimistic than their pessimistic ones, they in turn believe that 
these optimistic counterparts will be more likely to invest, which in turn explains why second-
order-optimistic subjects are themselves more likely to invest. Figure 8 displays these findings. 
The diamond-shaped points display average expectations of how many others will invest. For the 
top row showing Treatments BK/PK, these are broken out by beliefs about optimistic versus 
pessimistic investors (solid vs unfilled points, respectively). Circular points on all graphs show 
that these beliefs are roughly accurate with respect to chosen investment actions (on average in 
Treatments IK/NK, bottom row; and between optimistic and pessimistic investors on average in 
Treatments BK/PK).  
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Figure 7. CDFs of elicited second-order beliefs with actual distributions of elicited first-order beliefs shown for 
comparison
Treatment BK: own and partner ’s 
investment probability known
Treatment PK: own investment 
probability unknown, partner ’s known
Treatment IK: own investment 
probability known, partner ’s unknown
Treatment NK: own and partner ’s 
investment probability unknown
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Belief that those whose partner ’s investment probability is high invest
Belief that those whose partner ’s investment probability is low invest
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Of note, subjects seem to think that pessimistic investors will invest more often than they 
actually do; though this cannot explain why second-order-pessimistic subjects invest as 
frequently as Treatment PK subjects who do not know their own investment probability 
however. Treatment PK subjects have similar first-order beliefs as Treatment BK subjects, they 
simply have yet to resolve the uncertainty of whether their partner is optimistic or pessimistic 
before deciding whether to invest. Treatment PK subjects’ reduced belief that their partner 
invests is higher than second-order-pessimistic investors in Treatment BK; they should be more 
willing to invest. 
2.6.3 Within-treatment comparisons 
Table 12 shows the parameters from several estimated equations explaining investment 
decisions in a linear probability model (where 1 represents investment). Columns 1, 3 and 5 
reproduce comparisons gleaned from Figure 5 and Figure 6. Optimistic subjects in Treatments 
BK/PK are more likely than pessimistic subjects (the omitted category) to invest, and second-
order-optimistic subjects in Treatment BK are also more likely to invest, though this effect is 
lower in magnitude than that from changes in first-order beliefs, as the coefficient on own 
investment probability is smaller than that on partner investment probability. There is no 
significant impact on likelihood to invest for subjects in Treatment IK who observe their own 
investment probability is high relative to low. We should not expect any such difference. 
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Figure 8. First-order beliefs and investment choice frequencies 
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The second, fourth and sixth columns of Table 12 control for beliefs. The seventh column 
explains investment decisions in Treatment NK, where there is obviously no investment 
probability information to condition on but belief that others will invest is quite significant. 
Treatment IK investment decisions are explained in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 12, 
where subjects can condition on their own investment probability, but should not. Indeed this 
information does not have a significant impact on investment decisions. The effect of partner- 
and own-investment probability on investment appear to be significantly reduced once 
controlling for beliefs as we expect these treatments to operate by inducing changes in beliefs. 
Furthermore, it does not appear that there is any particular joint effect for investment pairs where 
both partners have high investment probability (Table 12, Treatment BK, own×partner 
investment probability). We do not expect this coefficient to be significantly different from zero 
since knowledge of own and partner investment probability have additively separable predicted 
impacts on beliefs (Table 10). 
Table 12. Probability of investing (OLS) 
Treatment BK PK IK NK 
Own prob. High .267
**
 .118
**
   .045 .083
**
   
 (.052) (.061)   (.052) (.041)   
Partner prob. High .351
**
 .338
**
 .334
**
 .334
**
     
 (.063) (.060) (.053) (.053)     
Guess  .490
**
  .740
**
  .966
**
 1.02
**
 
  (.095)  (.123)  (.166) (.173) 
Own & partner prob. High .010 .022       
 (.076) (.070)       
Round and subject fixed effects, jackknifed standard errors (in parentheses) treat the subject as the unit of 
observation, 
**
 indicates significance at 5% 
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2.6.4 Between-treatment comparisons 
What are the consequences for investment of resolving higher-order uncertainty about beliefs? Is 
it simply the case that knowing your partner is optimistic causes more investment while 
knowledge that your partner is pessimistic causes a similar drop in investment levels? Table 13 
examines the effect of knowing one’s own investment probability on investment – relative to not 
knowing this information. Pooling choice data from treatments BK and PK (IK and NK) in the 
same regression allows us to examine the effect of own investment probability conditional on 
partner investment probability (or not, as in Treatments IK/NK). Individual subject fixed effects 
are lost since subjects in treatments PK and NK never know their own investment probability; 
this is the omitted category. The first column confirms what we see in the graph from Figure 6 
comparing investment decisions in Treatment BK to those in PK. second-order-optimistic 
subjects in Treatment BK invest significantly more than second-order-pessimistic subjects, who 
invest about as often as subjects in Treatment PK. The second column of Table 13, like the first 
column of Table 12, shows that this effect is largely mediated through induced changes in beliefs 
as all of the estimated coefficients become insignificant when beliefs are added as explanatory 
variables. There are no significant differences in investment frequency between Treatment IK 
subjects observing their own investment probability to be high or low and Treatment NK 
subjects. We conclude that a mean-preserving resolution of higher-order uncertainty can have 
asymmetric consequences for efficiency. 
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Table 13. Probability of investing (OLS) 
Treatments BK+PK IK+NK 
Own prob. High .236
**
 .021 -.003 .115 
 (.058) (.051) (.140) (.080) 
Own prob. Low -.062 -.004 -.044 .036 
 (.054) (.044) (.139) (.084) 
Partner prob. High .337
**
 .338
**
   
 (.039) (.037)   
Guess  .851
**
  1.25
**
 
  (.070)  (.066) 
Round and subject fixed effects, jackknifed standard errors (in parentheses) treat the subject as the unit of 
observation, 
**
 indicates significance at 5% 
 
2.6.5 Probability models 
The linear probability models estimated above provide some easily-interpretable facts on subject 
reactions to treatments, but a more micro-level specification provides further insight into how 
subjects react. In Stag Hunt investment games, a rational player i will prefer to invest if her 
subjective belief that her partner invests, P ( Invest )−i, exceeds some threshold probability ci, and 
will prefer not to invest if it does not. Thus decisions made in this game lend themselves to 
modeling with a fixed-effects logit specification.  
Formally, player i invests if P ( Invest )−i,t + εit > ci, where εit is a logistically distributed 
decision error with mean zero and unknown scale parameter β. I estimate this model by explicitly 
solving for the fixed effects using standard maximum likelihood, rather than the conditional 
likelihood formulation usually employed to estimate fixed-effects logit models (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005). Note that the incidental parameters problem inherent in this method requires us to 
use a bias-correcting procedure à la Hahn and Newey (2004) (the delete-1 jackknife is 
employed). The advantage of explicitly estimating the fixed effects ci in this model is that we 
may generate predicted investment probabilities under counterfactual situations, which will be 
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necessary to predict whether the asymmetry of the treatment effect estimated in the first column 
of Table 12 would be expected using our model of investment behavior. 
2.6.5.1 Third-order beliefs? 
In Treatment BK, common knowledge of investment probabilities should induce even higher 
(third-order) changes in beliefs. This works as follows: if players in Treatment BK expect that 
their second-order-optimistic partners will be more likely to invest than second-order-pessimistic 
partners (they do; and elicited second-order beliefs indicate that subjects recognize this) then 
subjects should be more likely to invest when seeing that their partner’s investment probability is 
high. Furthermore the response should be above and beyond the exogenously increased 
probability of investment the treatment induces. 
I focus on just how much any additional third-order effects from knowledge of partner 
investment probability have on P( Invest )−i for subjects in Treatment BK versus those in 
Treatment PK, whose first-order beliefs should mechanically be higher by .33 when their 
partner’s investment probability is high. Since first-order beliefs are elicited with respect to 
chosen actions, we model information changing these beliefs as 
P
 
( Invest )−i,t = ⅔ guessit + δ · optimistic 
since investment choices are carried out with ⅔ probability. We expect δ to be ⅓ in Treatment 
PK and higher in Treatment BK. Specifically, since second-order-optimistic subjects in 
Treatment BK are 27% more likely on average to invest than their second- order-pessimistic 
counterparts (Table 12, first column), we should expect δ to be around ⅓ + ⅔ (.272) = .515 in 
Treatment BK. 
Results are shown in Table 14. The estimate of δ from Treatment PK is significantly less 
than .33. Furthermore, while the estimate of δ from Treatment BK is no greater than .33, it is 
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significantly higher than the Treatment PK estimate ( p = .08 ). The difference between these 
estimates is less than we would expect however, indicating that there is significant under-
reaction to the treatment at this level of reasoning (third-order) relative to lower orders
11
. We 
conclude that consideration of beliefs even up to the third order may be relevant in predicting 
investment decisions. 
Table 14. Fixed-effects logit regressions of investment choice on beliefs and observable factors 
Treatment BK PK 
β 8.42 14.8 
 (1.02) (2.89) 
δ .332 .237 
 (.049) (.045) 
Round fixed effects, jackknifed standard errors (in parentheses) treat the subject as the unit of observation 
 
2.6.5.2 Asymmetry of the treatment effect 
The asymmetry of the treatment effect shown in previous subsections merits deeper 
investigation. Specifically, since we have shown that different higher-order beliefs matter for 
whether people successfully coordinate, confirming the mechanism by which this happens is 
important for deriving predictions. Does the asymmetry in actions result from an asymmetric or 
behaviorally anomalous response, or is observed data consistent with the model of Section 2.3. 
What are the social welfare con- sequences of resolving higher-order uncertainty about beliefs? 
                                                 
11 As an interesting aside, if global games experiments require a certain number of 
reasoning iterations before we should expect to observe equilibrium selection results, then these 
much-diminished third-order effects found here offer support for Heinemann and Cornand 
(2011)’s assertion that weak selection results in their game arise from a limited number of 
iterated reasoning steps. 
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Is it simply the case that knowing your partner is optimistic causes more investment while 
knowledge that your partner is pessimistic causes a similar drop in investment levels? Would 
investors in Treatment PK continue to invest at the same levels if they knew their own 
investment probability was high or low? More importantly, would they invest with the same 
frequencies as subjects in Treatment BK? Figure 9 provides some evidence on this question. The 
left pane displays model predictions for Treatment BK subjects. The series marked with upward-
pointing and downward-pointing triangles are simply the estimated investment probabilities 
predicted by the model whose parameters are shown in the first column of Table 14 (for 
knowledge of own investment probability high and low, respectively). The third series in this 
graph, indicated by circles, is a counterfactual estimate of Treatment BK subjects’ investment 
probability if they did not know their own investment probability. We should in fact expect 
subjects to be only marginally more likely to invest when not knowing their own investment 
probability relative to knowing that it is low. The right-hand pane of Figure 9 corroborates this 
finding. Here, the series indicated by circles is the predicted investment probability of Treatment 
PK subjects in Treatment PK, using the model whose parameters are given in the second column 
of Table 14. The two other series in this graph are counterfactual investment probabilities 
computed by supposing that subjects in Treatment PK did know their own investment probability 
to be high (upward-pointing triangles) or low (downward-pointing triangles). Again, the same 
pattern emerges: we should expect higher levels of investment when own investment probability 
is known to be high and lower (but comparable) for those who do not know their own investment 
probability or know it to be low. This implies that (for the preferences and beliefs of my 
experimental subjects in this setting at least) that it is completely rational for resolution of 
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higher-order uncertainty about others’ beliefs to generate significantly higher levels of 
coordination. 
 
Figure 9. First-order beliefs and investment choice frequencies 
 
2.7 DISCUSSION 
The results of the experiment allow us to conclude that consideration of what others think about 
your beliefs significantly influences investment decisions in a coordination game. Knowing that 
others think you likely to invest causes people to be more likely to invest themselves. My unique 
experimental design exogenously shifts beliefs holding fundamental payoffs constant and allows 
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us to identify how higher-order beliefs matter when deciding whether to invest. The experimental 
treatments change peoples’ second-order beliefs by varying the information that others know 
about them. Differential second-order beliefs in turn change first-order beliefs and in turn 
decisions, because beliefs determine what rational agents choose to do in coordination games, 
and so beliefs about beliefs determine beliefs about choices. There is also some evidence that 
subjects under-react to induced changes in beliefs, particularly to partner investment probability 
in Treatment BK (where responding optimally entails consideration of third-order beliefs). 
 Broadly, this means that common knowledge of prevailing attitudes is necessary in 
sustaining equilibria. Heterogeneous societies’ inability to coordinate on norms can explain why 
they have lower social cohesion (e.g. Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000-02). Not 
knowing what others think about your beliefs frustrates coordination. The finding that human 
subjects reason about coordination at at least the second level reinforces the plausibility of this 
explanation which, unlike simple in-group out-group identification, conforms to more nuanced 
recent findings such as those from Putnam (2007) who documents less in-group social cohesion 
in more diverse communities. The alignment of social and individual incentives in the Stag Hunt 
game means that conventional economic models of decision-making explain the data quite well. 
The strategic incentives present in this game are relevant to any setting where social norms or 
technology create multiple equilibria however. For example, Greiff and Paetzel (2012) show in a 
finitely repeated public good setting that information about the subjective ratings that previous 
partners have given you is important only when they are common knowledge. 
Comparison between treatments indicates that subjects behave equivalently under 
unresolved higher-order uncertainty and higher-order uncertainty that is resolved as the worst 
outcome. This is apparently consistent with rational decision making. It also suggests some 
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policy implications. The meeting of different cultures may destabilize efficient social norms; but 
we might expect society to reestablish coordination as people learn more about each other. This 
is because resolving uncertainty in favor of the efficient norm may increase adherence while 
resolving it in favor of the other has no effect. Cross-cultural understanding is of course a core 
mission of several existing civic organizations. These range from the 1893 Parliament of the 
World’s Religions at the World Columbian Expedition in Chicago, to the United Nations 
declaration of 2001 as the “Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations”. To the naive economist, 
these may seem like puzzling enterprises; but the results herein suggest that efforts to promote 
common knowledge of cultural norms are quite worthwhile. As societies across the world 
become more diverse, we can benefit from specialization and trade while coping with the stress 
this places on social cohesion. 
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3.0  THE IMPACT OF SHOCKS TO SOCIAL CAPITAL: EVIDENCE FROM 
BURGLARIES (WITH RANDALL WALSH) 
A body of evidence links social capital, particularly measures of generalized trust, with better 
macroeconomic and institutional performance. Microeconomists have found correlations 
between higher social capital and efficiency-promoting behavior in economically important 
situations. We develop a unique quasi-experimental survey design that allows identification of 
the structural relationships between trust attitudes and incentivized economic behavior. As an 
exogenous shock to social capital we identify households located in the same city block that are 
both proximate and further from property crimes. We find that neighbors of burglary victims 
have lower levels of generalized trust than their socio-demographically similar neighbors living 
marginally further from the burglary. We also find suggestive evidence that their lower 
generalized trust causes them to invest less with a principle who may abscond with their 
investment and additionally leads them to contribute less to a public good. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Economists have come to recognize the importance that social capital plays in a wide range of 
economic activity. The connections that bind people to their communities can allow them to 
realize gains from trade that do not necessarily arise from narrow self-interest, explicit contracts, 
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or government provision. When people feel connected to their communities, they can expect 
continuing relationships of mutual benefit, will adhere to norms that support those relationships, 
and can trust that others in their community will also uphold these norms. These connections, 
norms and the expectations of trust that arise therefrom are termed social capital. Social capital 
is shown in a variety of studies to potentially have significant economic consequences, ranging 
from individual-level studies correlating social connections with higher incomes (Narayan & 
Pritchett, 1999), to cross-country studies showing that societies with higher rates of generalized 
trust experience more economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1998; Algan & Cahuc, 2010) as well 
as better institutional performance along a wide range of metrics (Putnam, 1993; La Porta et al., 
1998). Less is known about how the level of social capital in a society can change and what 
factors might effect such changes. While studies such as Putnam (1993)’s suggest differences in 
social capital across societies can persist over centuries, Algan and Cahuc (2010) show that 
changes in a society’s generalized trust can predict changes in economic growth. There is also 
much more to be learned about the precise mechanisms – that is specific forms of social and 
economic interaction – through which social capital might generate higher growth and better 
institutional performance. Studies in experimental economics have shown that generalized trust 
predicts greater voluntary contributions to public goods (Anderson et al., 2004; Thöni et al., 
2012) as well as greater likelihood to invest in coordination games (Bosworth, forthcoming 
2013), and provide mixed evidence that people with more social capital invest more in trust 
games (Berg et al., 1995). These studies use pre-existing differences in social capital to explain 
behavior in various investment situations. 
In order to explain how changes in social capital resulting from real life experiences 
translate into changes in behavior, we report results from a novel field experiment through which 
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we examine the influence of property crime on social capital. Survey measures indicate that 
participants who live closer to burglarized houses suffer adverse shocks to their social capital. 
We then investigate whether these exogenous shocks to social capital affect behavior in an 
incentivized trust game, a coordinated investment (stag hunt) game, and a charitable donation 
task. Participants who score higher on survey measures of social capital send more in the trust 
game and donate more to a charitable cause; and we find suggestive evidence that subjects who 
experience shocks to their surveyed social capital send less in the trust game and donate less to 
charity. We thus shed light on the hidden external costs of property crime on communities’ social 
capital, and argue that erosion of generalized trust may have material consequences. 
3.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Aspects of social interaction that enable, connect and coordinate economic activity have been 
grouped under the concept of social capital. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics gives 
overlapping definitions (Dasgupta, 2008): 
‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’ Putnam, 1993, p. 167; 
‘social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms 
of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.’ Putnam (2000, p. 19); 
and 
‘Social capital generally refers to trust, concern for one’s associates, a willingness to live 
by the norms of one’s community and to punish those who do not’ Bowles and Gintis, 
2002, p. F419. 
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Social capital is most commonly measured with survey instruments such as those found in the 
General Social Survey or World Values survey. The standard `trust question', found in both, is  
‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be 
too careful in dealing with people?’. 
Henceforth we refer to this question as GSS_trust. 
3.2.1 Social capital and society-level outcomes 
The literature argues that the economic relevance of social capital can be seen in its importance 
to institutions and macroeconomic performance. Putnam (1993) contrasts local government 
effectiveness among the regions of Italy following power devolution in the 1970s. He correlates 
several measures of perceived government effectiveness; most importantly citizen 
powerlessness, corruption, respect for the law and public safety; with measures of civic 
engagement; including referendum turnout, newspaper readership, number of sports and cultural 
associations, political machines influence, and perceived trust in others. He finds that higher 
levels of civic engagement are associated with more effective governance. Putnam argues against 
a causal interpretation of his data, emphasizing that “norms and networks of civic engagement 
contribute to economic prosperity and in turn are reinforced by that prosperity.” Knack and 
Keefer (1998) find correlations between trust and civic norms as measured on the World Values 
Survey with measures of economic performance in 29 countries. These include growth, 
investment share of GDP, labor force growth, openness to trade, black market penetration, 
strength of property rights, currency depreciation, creditworthiness, and inequality. La Porta et 
al. (1998) find that standard generalized trust measures track a very broad range of institutional 
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and economic performance outcomes
12
. They argue that most organizations need to maintain 
trust among their members to function effectively: firms, nonprofits, and governments 
characterized by high trust and trustworthiness should perform better. Higher trust enables 
organizations to grow larger since large organizations entail imperfect monitoring within the 
institution and greater reliance on norms of behavior to enforce cooperation among its members. 
Numerous studies have shown social capital is associated with desirable microeconomic 
outcomes. Narayan and Pritchett (1999) examine data from the Social Capital and Poverty 
Survey on households in rural Tanzanian villages. They find that households with more group 
memberships (e.g. political, religious, farmers’ groups or women’s groups) have higher incomes 
as measured by consumption expenditures. Supplemental data on the villages from the Human 
Resource Development Survey suggest that village-level social capital also raises household 
incomes and predicts access to better public services, use of advanced agricultural practices, 
participation in communal activities, and access to credit. Adler and Kwon (2002) argue that 
social capital increases productivity in workplaces. Social capital strengthens networks that 
foster employer-employee matches, is associated with internal promotion reduced turnover, 
supports research and development and encourages workers to share ideas and work on projects 
requiring collaboration. 
                                                 
12 These include efficiency of the judiciary, corruption, bureaucratic quality, tax 
compliance, civic participation, participation in professional associations, share of top 20 firms 
in GNP, adequacy/quality of infrastructure, infant mortality, high school completion, educational 
system adequacy, inflation, growth and GNP per capita. 
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3.2.2 Mechanisms 
Why do societies with high social capital exhibit better economic and institutional performance? 
Individuals in high-trust societies may make different decisions than their low-trust counterparts. 
As discussed above, social capital is conventionally assessed using questionnaires that measure 
generalized trust or specific outcomes of social capital, such as those questions contained in the 
World Values Survey and General Social Survey. While these surveys cover large samples, they 
do not inform us about how people with high generalized trust make different decisions than 
those with low generalized trust. This prompts behavioral decision researchers to ask whether 
generalized trust measures predict more trusting choices in controlled economic experiments. 
Fehr et al. (2003) combine a demographic and trust attitude survey with the ‘sender-
receiver’ trust game (Berg et al., 1995) implemented via postal mail with a representative sample 
of Germans. In the trust game, a sender makes a choice on how much money to transfer to a 
receiver. Money sent is multiplied; hence sending the entirety of one’s endowment maximizes 
social surplus. The receiver has the ability, but no obligation, to return some of the resulting 
surplus to the sender. Fehr et al. find that affirmative responses to the WVS trust attitude 
question
13
 do predict the amount transferred by the sender in the trust game, but not the amount 
returned by the receiver. 
In contrast, Glaeser et al. (2000) do not find that affirmative responses to the GSS trust 
questions predict behavior in either the trust game or an ‘envelope drop’. The envelope drop 
activity elicits subjects’ valuations for an envelope that was to be anonymously left in Harvard 
Square but addressed to them. Thus, the more trusting a subject is, the more they should be 
                                                 
13
 The English language version of this question corresponds to GSS_trust. 
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willing to pay for the envelope. The authors find some support that survey questions correlate 
with receiver transfers in the trust game, which indicates trustworthy behavior. However, they 
find no correlation between trusting behavior (as measured by the amount transferred by the 
sender in the trust game or willingness to pay for the dropped envelope) and survey questions 
about trusting attitudes. This study casts doubt on surveys’ ability to measure social capital and 
instead suggests that the behavioral responses examined are better metrics of social capital. 
Karlan (2005) conducts a field study that replicates the null result of Glaeser et al., but 
suggests that responses to survey trust questions do predict other economic decisions where 
generalized trust is relevant. He has participants in a Peruvian microcredit program play both the 
Berg et al. trust game and a linear public good game with voluntary contributions. He is able to 
link participants’ behavior in these games to observations of each participant’s history with the 
microcredit program and attitudes measured by WVS/GSS trust questions. While returning 
money that one has been sent in the trust game is correlated with microloan repayment; sending 
money in this game (the behavior that Glaeser et al. find is unrelated to trust attitudes) does not 
predict the amount of money that individuals invest with the microcredit program. Survey trust 
questions do however predict the amount saved. Karlan does not find that behavior in the public 
good game correlates with either repayment or saving in the microcredit program or with trust 
attitude questions. 
Anderson et al. (2004), find that the GSS trust question administered in a post-game 
survey predicts the amount invested in the public account of a voluntary contribution public good 
game. Thöni, Tyran and Wengström (2012) find that affirmative answers to the trust question 
predict being a conditional contributor to a linear public good (Fischbacher et al., 2001). 
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Responses to the standard GSS trust question is not robustly related to beliefs in the Thöni et al. 
experiment, but it seems to boost contributions at all levels of belief about other contributions. 
These studies indicate that people with more social capital may behave in ways that 
secure more efficient outcomes in a variety of settings that require generalized trust. Our study 
seeks to examine how a novel source of exogenous variation, crime, may shock social capital, as 
such these outcomes of social capital are quite relevant. We therefore implement a trust game 
and a stag hunt investment game, as well as ask participants to contribute to a real public good in 
our study. Our aim is to test whether shocks to social capital can predict less trusting behavior in 
these settings. 
3.2.3 Crime and social capital 
To assess the impact that negative shocks to social capital have on behavior, we turn to property 
crime as a plausible influence. There are several reasons to believe that crime may adversely 
affect social capital. For instance, the existence of crime could signal to individuals that they are 
not safe from expropriation, and that other individuals are willing to transgress social norms 
against expropriation. The occurrence of crime also may signal an implicit failing of society’s 
crime deterrence institutions, as an effective criminal justice system (police and courts) should be 
able to identify expropriators and deliver appropriate punishment to deter others from engaging 
in similar crimes. The expectation that one can trust the judicial system to protect one’s interests 
effectively and equitably is a key prerequisite to the functioning of a market economy. For 
example, North and Weingast (1989) prominently argue that English constitutional 
developments protecting property rights promoted investment early in its economic 
development. Additionally, since crime is often deterred through the private initiative of other 
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community members, the occurrence of crime erodes confidence in other individuals in one’s 
community. Jane Jacobs (1961) observes that cohesive communities can deter crime through 
simple awareness. Crime that is visible to third-party observers will vary in success depending 
on the actions taken by those observers. Whether people who witness crime intervene, or alert 
others in the community or authorities, can have dramatic consequences for criminals and their 
victims. 
There are also reasons to suspect that crime and social capital are co-determined. 
Communities with higher social capital may more effectively deter crime because their 
institutions perform better, they have stronger norms discouraging expropriation and promoting 
good samaritanship, or simply because they feel safer they will encourage “more eyes” to be out 
on the street. Lederman et al. (2002) show that generalized trust and membership in secular 
organizations predicts lower homicide rates in a cross-section of countries, controlling for 
economic growth and inequality. Akçomak and ter Weel (2012) report that variation in crime 
rates across Dutch municipalities is negatively associated with social capital indicators such as 
charitable giving, voter turnout, blood donation, affirmative responses to the standard 
generalized trust questions, and measures of social stability (migration, divorce rates, and 
presence of immigrants). The association between crime and social capital remains when 
instrumenting for the latter with historical data on the presence of foreigners and percentage of 
protestants in the municipality in 1859. Buonanno, et al. (2009) report similar results in a 
comparison of property crime rates across Italian regions. Blood donation rates and prevalence of 
civic associations are negatively correlated with property crime rates controlling for judicial 
effectiveness, socioeconomic and demographic factors. They also instrument for social capital 
using the historical data on local civic associations constructed by Putnam (1993) for his study. 
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The rarity or prevalence of crime may also lead people to place more or less trust in their 
communities and institutions, and to more confidently form relationships which yield social or 
economic benefits. For example, Blanco and Ruiz (2013) show that trust in state institutions in 
Colombia is negatively related to violent crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity. We 
therefore design our study with these inference difficulties clearly in mind. 
3.3 DESIGN 
Our approach examines the effect that very localized proximity to crime has on social capital and 
economic decision making. Attitudes and decisions are elicited on a postal survey which 
combines attitudinal questions related to social capital and generalized trust with three 
incentivized economic games. Participants’ responses and decisions are then compared by 
dividing the sample into those very close to burglarized homes and those a few houses away in 
the same sample of city blocks. We observe burglaries in low-crime neighborhoods and then 
survey households on the block where the crime occurs, shortly after it happens. We then 
examine within-block variation in attitudes and behavior related to social capital. Our procedure 
is as follows: we monitor police blotters in the city of Pittsburgh for burglaries. The blotters 
identify the city block, but not the specific address where the burglary takes place. We then 
determine if the blocks where burglaries happen are candidates for surveying. Candidate blocks 
must be composed entirely of single-family residential structures, must not have experienced any 
violent or property crimes in the preceding 12 months, and must contain at least 10 owner-
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occupant
14
 households to whom surveys can be mailed. We choose these criteria for 
identification purposes. Residents of neighborhoods where crime is prevalent will already have 
incorporated this knowledge into their attitudes. By surveying lower-crime neighborhoods of 
single family houses we aim to observe people who are invested in their communities and whose 
perceptions might be changed by crime happening very close to them. Additionally, the single-
family house criterion ensures that we do not survey blocks where burglaries happen at 
commercial structures or inside apartment buildings (where the crime may be less observable or 
residents may be less concerned), and that we can address the householder(s) by name. We seek 
at least 10 households to mail per block to increase the likelihood of observing multiple houses 
per block. 
Surveys are mailed to owner-occupant households on the candidate block the day 
following the reported burglary. These surveys are designed to elicit demographic information, 
attitudinal measures related to social capital, and behavior in three incentivized economic 
situations. Households that complete and return the survey are promised a $10 debit card and a 1 
in 10 probability that the decisions they make on the economic game tasks carried out for real 
compensation. This randomization is accomplished by printing a digit on each survey that must 
match the final digit of a future drawing of the Pennsylvania Lottery’s Daily Number game for 
the respondent to receive payment for her decisions in the three games. Surveys are identified by 
number, and responses are kept separate from the crosswalk of addresses to ID numbers. Some 
                                                 
14
 We define owner-occupancy with respect to public real estate records: if the owner of 
the dwelling’s listed address is the same as that of the dwelling itself we assume that she is an 
owner-occupant and not otherwise. 
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time after completed surveys are returned, we learn the specific address where each crime 
happened, and then code the proximity of each respondent’s house to the victim’s. The full 
survey is available upon request. The first 14 questions are demographic in nature. These 
comprise questions on gender, race, age, citizenship, marital status, number of children, 
education and employment status. We then ask a series of survey questions designed to asses 
how respondents’ social capital is affected by crime. Of particular interest are questions on 
community engagement, trust in institutions, and generalized trust in others. These are all written 
so as to be forward-looking rather than backward-looking as respondents are surveyed shortly 
after the shock occurs (surveys are mailed the day after the crime is reported).  Many of these 
questions are adapted from the General Social Survey or World Values Survey, and indeed the 
primary questions of interest are taken verbatim from them, most notably GSS_trust (Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people?). We have respondents choose from a 5-point Likert scale where 1 
represents “need to be very careful” and 5 represents “most people can be trusted”15. Also 
adapted from the WVS are “civic-mindedness” questions assessing the relative appropriateness 
of various antisocial behaviors such as claiming government benefits not entitled to, avoiding 
public transport fares, tax evasion, keeping found money, and failing to report damage to parked 
vehicles. These are prominently examined by Knack and Keefer’s growth study along with 
GSS_trust. 
The incentivized economic games are as follows: the first is a trust game (Berg et al., 
1995) in which half of the survey participants, who have been assigned the role of “sender” are 
                                                 
15
 Both the mean and the median of GSS_trust are 3.0 on the 5-point scale. 
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endowed with $30 that they can allocate between themselves and a “receiver” (the other half of 
the mailed surveys are assigned the receiver role). Every dollar sent to the receiver is tripled, and 
receivers can (but are not obligated to) send some portion of this money back to the sender at 
their discretion. Since this is a sequential move game, receiver decisions are elicited for each 
possible amount a sender could have transferred (i.e. the strategy method pioneered by Selten, 
1967 is used). The amount transferred by the sender is frequently interpreted as a measure of 
trust and the amount returned by the receiver is interpreted as a measure of trustworthiness. It is 
efficient for the sender to trust the receiver with her entire endowment, though not rational if she 
believes the receiver to have only pecuniary motives. The second task is known as the Stag Hunt, 
and is a symmetric two-person game in which the participants have a risky but profitable 
investment opportunity and a safe outside option. If both invest, they realize positive profits, but 
if either person declines to invest, the investment will not be successful and a solitary investor 
will realize a payoff of zero from foregoing her outside option. The game payoffs are 
summarized in Table 15. When both people invest, they both earn $9. If one person invests but 
the other does not, then the person who chose to invest will earn nothing. If a person decides not 
to invest, she earns $5, regardless of the other person’s decision. The efficient outcome in this 
game is for both people to invest, though for this to be rational, one must believe that the other 
person will also invest. In the final task, participants are given an additional $30 endowment that 
they may keep for themselves, or donate some portion of to a charitable cause (the Greater 
Pittsburgh Community Food Bank). Each dollar donated to the food bank is additionally matched 
by the researchers. This task is meant to elicit charitable behavior and willingness to finance a 
public good (feeding the needy). 
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Table 15. Payoffs in the stag hunt game 
  Player 2 
  Invest Don’t invest 
Player 1 
Invest $9, $9 $0, $5 
Don’t invest $5, $0 $5, $5 
3.4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Over the period of February 2012 through June 2013, 40 qualifying burglaries were observed. 
622 survey packets were mailed to these 40 blocks. From those, we received 92 returned surveys 
(a response rate just above 15 percent). Of these, there were 79 white respondents, 11 black, 2 
Hispanic, and 2 who identified as “other” (i.e. not one of the US Census race or ethnicity 
categories). The mean respondent’s age was 53 years old; 45 respondents were male and 47 were 
female. 
Data from the Pittsburgh Police Department identify the address of the burglarized house. 
Our treatment classification is constructed based on the possible ability of a respondent to 
observe the burglarized house. We expect that respondents who are able to see the burglarized 
house from their own will be more likely to know about the crime and thus have likely to have 
negative shocks to their social capital. The variable treated variable therefore takes on the value 
of 1 for burglary victims themselves, any house next door to the burglarized house, and the five 
houses on the opposite side of the street in front of the burglarized house. This variable takes on 
the value 0 for all other observations. 
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Figure 10. Victim (dark grey) and neighbors (lighter) 
The questions on our survey can be classified into three categories: time-invariant 
demographic controls that we maintain are exogenous to within-block burglary incidence, a set 
of attitudinal survey questions informed by extant studies on social capital, and the three 
incentivized investment decisions. At present, we have 76 fully identified observations, and the 
small sample size guides much of the analysis to follow (though 92 surveys were returned 
between February 2012 and June 2013; incomplete responses and discrepancies between the 
police blotter and geographically identified police data reduce this total)
16
. 
The set of explanatory variables is sufficiently rich that a standard regression approach 
utilizing all of the data would more than exhaust the available degrees of freedom. With respect 
to the social capital survey questions, we address this issue by adopting a systematic approach 
incorporating factor analysis. For reference the social capital responses are associated with 
questions 15-30 from the survey packet and correspond to the 21 variables listed in Table 16. 
                                                 
16
 84 of the 92 returned surveys are geographically identified. 76 are geographically 
identified and answer all questions. The analysis to follow is restricted to the 76 respondents that 
are identified and answer all questions. 
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These questions were all designed to elicit behaviors and attitudes related to social captial. Table 
16 reports the factor loadings from a factor analysis on these questions revealing that the 
responses to these questions all seem to reflect social capital as an underlying factor. We focus 
on only the most explanatory factor. Our variables’ factor loadings on this factor have the signs 
we would predict from the social capital literature – with two exceptions. These are “If you had a 
dispute with one of your neighbors or coworkers, how likely do you think it is that any of your 
friends or family members would find out about it from someone other than yourself?” and the 
relative acceptability of “Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to”. These 
two questions are omitted and another factor analysis is performed. We use this to predict values 
of the underlying factor and retain as the variable sc, which we standardize to have zero mean 
and standard deviation 1. 
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Table 16. Factor loadings from factor analysis of social capital survey measures 
 Factors 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10… 
city .443 .195 .155 .369 -.247 -.170 .093 -.015 .088 .074 
nonprofit .341 -.081 .338 .291 -.213 .282 .035 -.023 -.092 .120 
residents .331 .126 .272 .496 -.086 -.117 .048 -.162 -.087 -.111 
important_ charity .482 -.251 .040 -.367 .143 .303 .088 -.091 .050 .065 
volunteering .449 .097 .074 -.034 .460 -.280 .114 -.124 -.027 .105 
vote .391 -.308 .332 -.232 -.133 .188 .085 -.189 .126 -.074 
meetings .370 -.175 .290 -.250 -.174 -.271 -.135 .030 -.012 .139 
club .324 -.064 -.140 .004 .381 -.072 .052 -.047 -.298 -.028 
gss_trust .696 .257 -.317 -.137 .060 .065 -.220 -.052 -.047 -.136 
gss_fair .653 .308 -.416 -.072 -.225 -.007 -.070 .016 -.043 .078 
gss_help .715 .209 -.189 .045 -.102 .167 -.073 .128 .052 .072 
trustworthy .408 -.227 .238 .006 .172 -.030 .359 .254 .020 -.102 
newspaper .194 .017 -.028 -.057 .062 -.143 -.033 .360 .128 -.049 
dispute -.052 .181 .353 .220 .101 .117 -.349 .139 -.072 -.038 
invest .125 .121 .192 .174 .361 .169 -.008 .126 .038 .185 
job .274 .107 .137 .158 .309 .080 -.162 -.083 .208 -.208 
benefits .120 .731 .108 -.181 -.098 -.185 .148 -.052 .081 -.063 
fare -.188 .635 .309 -.261 -.032 -.007 .064 -.029 .002 .036 
taxes -.150 .487 -.199 .075 -.072 .301 .310 .083 -.101 -.071 
keep -.219 .130 -.413 .317 .235 .033 .060 -.130 .220 .145 
hit_run -.293 .543 .345 -.224 .187 .120 -.101 -.018 -.034 .063 
Eigenvalues 3.18 2.06 1.42 1.11 .978 .649 .533 .372 .271 .229 
 
Table 17 reports how means of our variables of interest, as well as means of the collected 
demographic control variables, vary by treatment group status (i.e. victims and their neighbors 
vs. other respondents). Three of 20 demographic variables, namely black, mother_us 
(respondent’s mother was born in the United States), divorced and widowed have significant 
differences in means. Subsequent analysis controls for either the full set of demographic controls 
or just these four where degrees of freedom permit, with results qualitatively unchanged. 
We begin our analysis by utilizing our proximity instrument to estimate how the social 
capital composite measure sc and the standard GSS_trust question respond to proximity to crime 
in Table 18. Our analysis suggests that respondents living in close proximity to the crime 
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(neighbors+victims) have lower social capital. Specifically, these respondents have measured 
social capital composite index about half of a standard deviation lower than their neighbors 
(columns 1-4) or over a half point lower on the 5-point Likert scale for GSS_trust (columns 5-8). 
Differences in sc are significant at at least the 5% level, and differences in GSS_trust range from 
marginally significant in the baseline specification to significant at the 10% level in the most 
powerful specification wich includes block fixed effects and a full set of demographic controls. 
Columns 2 and 6 of Table 18 demonstrate that the estimated effects are robust to controlling for 
block characteristics using fixed effects instead of clustering, columns 3 and 7 of Table 18 control 
for demographic information
17
, and columns 4 and 8 include fixed effects and controls. Results 
are generally robust across specifications. 
3.4.1 Decision tasks 
We now turn to the link between social capital and incentivized game behavior. Respondents 
assigned the “sender” role in the trust game transferred an average of $15.49 to the “receivers”, 
who sent back averages of $8.53, $16.52, $24.39, $32.52, $39.48, and $48.73 from (pre-
multiplied) transfers of $5, $10, $15, $20, $25, and $30, respectively. This means that any 
amount senders transferred would have been more than repaid, and in fact senders were left with 
slightly more than half of the post-multiplied surplus. Furthermore, the return schedule implies 
that it is rational from an ex-post perspective for risk-neutral senders to transfer their entire 
endowment to the receiver. This contrasts with laboratory trust game experiments, where senders 
typically transfer small amounts and are returned slightly less than they transferred on average 
                                                 
17
 Means of control variables are reported in Table III. 
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(e.g. Berg et al., 1995). In the Fehr et al. (2003) trust game field experiment that studies a 
representative sample of German adults, senders do transfer about half of their endowment, 
though they are also returned slightly less than the amount they transfer. Thus our sample 
appears to be rather more trusting and trustworthy than might be expected. Next, in the stag hunt 
game around 55.3% of our subjects choose to invest. Interestingly, the fraction that should make 
a risk-neutral participant indifferent between investing and not investing is 5/9 or 56%, meaning 
that participants in the stag hunt are roughly best-responding to the empirical frequency of 
others’ choices. Finally, the mean amount of the $30 endowment that respondents transferred to 
the Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank was $23.09, with a majority of respondents 
transferred the maximum amount of $30. 
Table 19 reports baseline correlations between social capital attitude measures and 
behavior in the incentivized decision tasks estimated by ordinary least squares. Columns 1-3 
have as a dependent variable the amount sent in the trust game
18
, columns 4-6 whether or not the 
respondent invested in the stag hunt game, and columns 7-9 donations to the food bank. 
Regressions reported in the top panel of Table 19 take our composite index sc as an explanatory 
variable, while those in the bottom panel use GSS_trust. Respondents with higher surveyed 
social capital and generalized trust send more on average in the trust game, and donate more to 
the food bank. A one standard deviation increase in the sc index predicts that the respondent will 
send an average of $2.59 more in the trust game. The bottom panel of Table 19 shows that a one 
point increase in the 5-point GSS_trust Likert scale predicts similar increases in amount 
                                                 
18
 Only 41 respondents participate in the sender role of the trust game, while all 
respondents participate in the stag hunt and donation task. 
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transferred by the sender in the trust game ($3.02). Estimates of the effects of increased social 
capital measures on donations to the food bank are also economically significant. A one 
standard-deviation increase in the sc index predicts food bank donation that is $3.10 higher on 
average, and a one-point increase in GSS_trust predicts a food bank donation $2.65 higher on 
average. Regressions reported in columns 2, 5, and 8 include the full set of demographic 
variables; and those in columns 3, 6, and 9 include block fixed effects. The estimated coefficients 
from these regressions are of a similar magnitude to those that do not include demographics or 
fixed effects, though some of them lose statistical significance
19
. Results from the stag hunt game 
are too imprecisely estimated to draw statistically or economically significant conclusions, 
though it should be noted that incentives on this task were set much lower than the trust game or 
food bank donation tasks due to constraints on the research budget, to the extent that the size of 
the maximum social surplus in the stag hunt was 5 times smaller than in the trust game. It is also 
possible that the subject pool may have found the stag hunt’s abstract bi-matrix presentation too 
unfamiliar to devote much thought to. Indeed, some respondents communicated their difficulty 
understanding this task. 
We finally consider crime-induced shifts in our attitude measures as instruments for the 
incentivized behavior in the three decision tasks. Table 20 displays two-stage least squares 
regressions analyzing the amount sent in the trust game (columns 1-3), whether or not the 
respondent invested in the stag hunt game (column 4-6), and donation to the food bank (column 
7-9). Columns 1, 4 and 7 do not include either fixed effects or controls, columns 2, 5, and 8 
                                                 
19
 The regression of send on sc with demographics yields a p-value of .110;  and those of 
GPCFB on sc and GSS_trust yield p-values of .162 and .243, respectively. 
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include block fixed effects, and columns 3, 6, and 9 control for a limited set of demographic 
information. Specifically, we only control for black, mother_us, divorced, and widowed since we 
have limited degrees of freedom and weak instruments (these are the demographic variables that 
Table 17 indicates differ significantly between the treatment and control groups). Point estimates 
suggest that respondents with higher surveyed social capital and generalized trust send more on 
average in the trust game, and donate more to the food bank. These effects are imprecisely 
estimated, and while not significant, they are of the same magnitude as those estimated under 
OLS. A one standard deviation increase in the sc index predicts that the respondent will send an 
average of $7.56 more in the trust game and donate $6.58 more to the food bank (p-values are 
.120 and .153, respectively). Recall for comparison these estimates were $2.59 and $3.10 under 
OLS. The bottom pane of Table 20 shows that a one point increase in the 5-point GSS_trust Likert 
scale predicts a $8.88 increase in amount transferred by the sender in the trust game, again with a 
large standard error (p-value .192). A one-point increase in GSS_trust predicts a food bank 
donation $9.04 higher on average (p-value .216). Compared to the OLS estimates, it now seems 
that respondents with higher social capital are less likely to invest in the stag hunt, though the 
fact that such effects only show up under instrumental variables (and like all the IV estimates, 
those for the stag hunt are rather imprecise, though generally at least as precise as those for the 
trust game and food bank donation). That the OLS estimates are indistinguishable from zero 
implies that only the treated respondents display this correlation between attitudes and 
behavior
20
. Including either block fixed effects or demographic variables in IV specifications 
does not discernibly affect the estimates. 
                                                 
20
 When the regressions of Table 19 are restricted to the subsample born after 1970 and 
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Table 17. Differences in means by treatment group 
 Treated Control Difference 
(p-value) 
sc -.278 .190 -.468 (.024)** 
gss_trust 2.77 3.15 -.375 (.170) 
send 13.2 16.7 -3.45 (.176) 
stag .681 .500 .181 (.146) 
gpcfb 20.7 24.1 -3.39 (.211) 
male .455 .481 .027 (.835) 
black .273 .074 .199 (.066)* 
hispanic .000 .019 -.019 (.322) 
other_race .000 .019 -.019 (.322) 
year_born 1958 1953 4.76 (.278) 
born_us 1.00 .963 .037 (.159) 
mother_us 1.00 .944 .056 (.083)* 
father_us 1.00 .926 .065 (.044) 
children .318 .333 .015 (.932) 
people_over_18 .773 1.13 -.357 (.127) 
married .500 .389 .111 (.391) 
divorced .000 .148 -.148 (.004)*** 
widowed .000 .111 -.111 (.013)** 
separated .000 .037 -.037 (.159) 
education 15.3 15.7 -.431 (.506) 
employed .636 .574 .062 (.587) 
years_in_pgh 14.0 13.7 .333 (.706) 
assess12 67927 68093 -165 (.985) 
assess13 108673 92660 16013 (.545) 
n 22 54  
                                                                                                                                                             
possessing at least some college education (a comparable population to that studied in Chapter 
1), we do find that respondents who score higher on sc and GSS_trust are significantly more 
likely to invest in the Stag Hunt game. Results for the trust game and food bank donation are 
qualitatively similar between the full sample and the young and educated subsample. IV 
regressions on this subsample yield no significant results, though IV coefficients are similar to 
the OLS coefficients in this subsample much like in the full sample. 
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Table 18. Differences in means by treatment group 
 Dependent variable 
 sc GSS_trust 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
treated -.516
***
 -.601
***
 -.665
**
 -.874
***
 -.375 -.485 -.609
*
 -.920
*
 
 (.184) (.185) (.320) (.288) (.277) (.333) (.373) (.459) 
constant .205 .229 -19.6 -3.61 3.15 3.18 -22.5 3.50 
 (.102) (.053) (29.1) (35.8) (.127) (.096) (26.5) (32.9) 
Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Fixed 
effects 
N Y N Y N Y N Y 
n 76 76 
F 7.84 10.57 – – 1.83 2.12 – – 
 
Table 19. OLS relationships between surveyed social capital and incentivized decision tasks 
 Dependent variable 
 send stag gpcfb 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
sc 2.59
**
 3.16 3.60
**
 -.039 -.046 -.027 3.10
***
 3.38
***
 1.81 
 (1.25) (1.89) (1.53) (.057) (.066) (.073) (1.09) (1.26) (1.26) 
constant 15.9 85.8 16.0 .554 -13.4 .554 22.9 226 23.0 
  (1.35) (214) (.218) (.058) (11.1) (.004) (1.05) (254) (.070) 
GSS_trust 3.02
***
 3.90
***
 3.14
*
 -.067 -.096
*
 -.046 2.65
**
 2.87
**
 1.76 
 (1.11) (1.28) (1.55) (.054) (.058) (.067) (1.23) (1.43) (1.47) 
constant 7.15 35.0 6.84 .755 -14.2 .691 15.0 234 17.7 
  (2.90) (214) (4.28) (.176) (10.3) (.204) (4.03) (262) (4.48) 
n 41 76 76 
Controls N Y N N Y N N Y N 
Fixed effects N N Y N N Y N N Y 
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Table 20. 2SLS regressions of incentivized task behavior on social capital 
measures using crime proximity as instrument 
 Dependent variable 
 send stag gpcfb 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
sc 7.56 10.4 5.37 -.352 -.469
*
 -.412 6.58 7.01 4.20 
 (4.87) (17.3) (7.25) (.239) (.285) (.345) (4.60) (6.37) (4.57) 
constant 16.6 23.6 16.3 .572 .264 .575 22.7 20.3 22.9 
  (2.05) (6.55) (1.56) (.052) (.684) (.081) (1.10) (6.30) (1.07) 
GSS_trust 8.88 6.84 6.52 -.484 -.522 -.511 9.04 7.80 5.21 
 (6.80) (8.78) (9.85) (.338) (.343) (.472) (7.30) (7.67) (5.96) 
constant -8.98 3.32 -2.49 2.02 1.60 2.11 -4.37 .311 7.27 
  (18.9) (23.3) (27.2) (1.02) (.926) (1.44) (21.9) (20.6) (18.1) 
n 41 76 76 
Controls N Y N N Y N N Y N 
Fixed effects N N Y N N Y N N Y 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Social capital is considered to be relevant to the effective functioning of societies. We present a 
novel experimental design that explores the impact of property crime on several dimensions of 
social capital. Our findings are threefold. First, we explore the use of factor analysis to measure 
social capital. The survey we develop measures a broad set of attitudes that are both relevant to 
how people see themselves in and interact with their community, and which are also plausibly 
disrupted by crime. Factor analysis indicates that it may be possible to link the responses to this 
wide range of attitude questions to a single underlying index of social capital. We compare this 
index to a question that is used as a standard measure of social capital and find that they are 
closely related and have similar explanatory potential, with the broader index seeming to be 
more powerful. Secondly, our quasi-random empirical design lets us evaluate the impact of one 
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potential type of shock to social capital, namely property crime. We find that both our broad 
measure and the standard measure are significantly and adversely impacted by proximity to 
burglaries. This result is robust to controlling for respondent demographics and city block-level 
variation. Finally, there is suggestive evidence indicating that shocks to social capital may have 
material consequences. Ordinary least squares shows that respondents with lower baseline levels 
of social capital send less in an incentivized trust game and donate less to charity. Instrumental 
variables regressions attempt to show whether those respondents whose social capital is 
adversely impacted by proximity to crime are adjusting their behavior in these tasks. These 
regressions yield qualitatively compatible results with those from OLS, but coefficients are not 
precise enough to draw definitive inferences. 
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APPENDIX A 
INCENTIVIZING CORRECT BELIEF REVELATION 
Suppose that a subject holds the belief that, on average, there is probability p that others will 
choose to invest. Denote the realized number of n other people who will choose to invest by ma 
and the guess submitted by the subject mg. We can then write the subject’s payoff from 
Estimation Task 1 as 
π1 = P ( mg = ma ) · u ( $3 or $1.50 ) 
where u is the subject’s utility of money. Since partners are ex-ante identically drawn from the 
population of other people in the room, the probability above is binomial: 
E ( π1 ) = PBIN ( n, p; mg ) · u ( · ). 
Maximizing expected payoff with respect to mg yields the mode of the binomial distribution: 
mg = ⌊  ( n + 1 ) p ⌋  
on all but an unmeasurable set of possible p. Since the experimenter observes n, it is possible to 
identify p as lying within a reasonably small interval. 
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A.1 SECOND-ORDER ELICITATION 
A similar argument will be applied to the second-order belief elicitation, but we will need to 
maintain a more restrictive expected utility assumption. As actions could be considered binomial, 
we may consider responses to Estimation Task 1 to be multinomial with n trials (other people) 
and n + 1 possible responses ( mg ∈  {0, 1, ... , n} ). Denote the probability of each response p0, p1, 
... , pn with ∑ pi = 1. Subjects must guess the number of people giving each response, denote this 
vector g = g0, g1, ... , gn with ∑ gi = n. Denote the vector of actual responses to Estimation Task 1 
a = a0, a1, ... , an with ∑ ai = n. The subject’s expected payoff from Estimation Task 2 is 
E ( π2 ) = ∑ P ( gi = ai ) · u ( $0.25 ). 
If we maximize with respect to g we simply get the modes of the marginal distributions (as the 
utility is linear in probabilities): 
gi =⌊ ( n + 1 ) pi⌋ . 
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APPENDIX B 
BELIEF UPDATING 
Table 21 displays estimated parameters from equations explaining elicited first-order beliefs. In 
all of these equations, current-period beliefs are regressed on last period’s beliefs and whether or 
not one’s partner invested, interacted with the conditions prevailing at the time (subjects in all 
treatments see the joint investment probabilities at the end of the round). There are individual 
subject and round fixed- effects. Since this is a lagged dependent variable model, the equation is 
estimated by two-stage least squares (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Round interactions are added 
since prior beliefs become more important relative to new information in later rounds. Since 
beliefs about both optimistic and pessimistic subjects are elicited each round, these appear as 
separate equations for treatments BK and PK. The right- most column pools beliefs from all 
treatments. Results are as we would expect given reasonable belief updating. Subjects whose 
partners invest are more likely to think that other people invest, though they discount 
observations of optimistic or second-order-optimistic partners investing. 
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Table 21. Instrumental variables regressions of beliefs on observable factors 
 
Treatment BK PK BK PK IK NK All 
Dependent variable Guess (opt.) Guess (pess.) Guess  
Guess-1 .040 .349
**
 .130 .082 .330
**
 .356
**
 .089
**
 
 (.094) (.096) (.116) (.092) (.102) (.105) (.041) 
Partner invests .063 .195
**
 .137 .001 .093 -.055 .043
**
 
 (.044) (.089) (.074) (.078) (.059) (.118) (.021) 
Partner invests×own prob. -.012 -.168 -.119 .003 -.027 .096 -.014 
 (.056) (.098) (.079) (.097) (.071) (.111) (.022) 
Partner invests×partner prob.  .032 -.242** -.087 -.015 -.133** .016 -.042 
 (.046) (.094) (.076) (.093) (.065) (.100) (.026) 
Partner invests×round .003 -.035 -.034 -.011 -.014 .027 -.003 
 (.012) (.025) (.033) (.021) (.015) (.027) (.008) 
Partner invests×own prob.  -.040 .230
**
 .087 .069 .127 -.094 .040 
×partner prob. (.073) (.108) (.098) (.119) (.097) (.122) (.034) 
Partner invests×own prob.  -.004 .041 .041 .016 .006 -.025 .004 
×round (.014) (.026) (.026) (.024) (.018) (.021) (.006) 
Partner invests×partner prob.  -.020 .045 .023 .017 .024 -.014 .005 
×round (.012) (.024) (.032) (.023) (.017) (.024) (.007) 
Partner invests×own prob.  .010 -.053 -.019 -.037 -.025 .023 -.010 
×partner prob.×round (.016) (.030) (.033) (.030) (.026) (.028) (.009) 
Round and subject fixed effects, jackknifed standard errors (in parentheses) treat the subject as the unit of 
observation, ** indicates significance at 5% 
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